Phishing Analysis
Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Visual Capture
Detection Info
http://www.z32p5.com/
Detected Brand
Binance
Country
International
Confidence
95%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
02b71150-226…
Analyzed
2026-01-19 12:21
Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T1EBD2453C728053BB46C782B4B565F73DD2D4CA9AC5279E4FF2E8826B178BC49CD41291 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
768:ZKF3z6dKWD0JTxp0j3kcfWi5UUIhG5S8rV60G7cS0RFta1NsLGarMZLPD12LEJ+D:8/za |
Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
bfc43bc03bc03dc8 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
ffb1e1e1ffffff0f |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
c96b6747438c0c1e |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
7d0181a0e1ffe707 |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
06000038000 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
c96b6747438c0c1e,49b049b4b4b0b018 |
Code Analysis
Threat Level
ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🔬 Threat Analysis Report
• Threat: Phishing site impersonating Binance
• Target: Binance users internationally
• Method: Mimics Binance's design and includes download buttons for apps
• Exfil: Likely collects user data through app downloads
• Indicators: Domain does not match Binance's official website, relatively new domain age
• Risk: HIGH - Potential for data theft and malware distribution
⚔️ Attack Methodology
Primary Method: SEO Poisoning Landing Page
Fake Binance page designed to appear in search results and trick users into visiting. May redirect to credential harvesting pages, malware downloads, or serve as a trust-building step before requesting sensitive information.
Secondary Method: Brand Impersonation
Uses stolen Binance branding elements and design to appear legitimate and build victim trust.
Similar Websites
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)
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