SafeMode - Analysis: emprestimoliberado.com

Visual Capture

Detection Info

https://emprestimoliberado.com/aa/inicio/01/

Detected Brand

Nubank

Country

International

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

06c484d8-09b…

Analyzed

2026-02-12 13:52

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1F832EB7072901ABB91CBD2E1B275AF5A72C8CB4BCA5BD701A3F983845FC7C92DD48254
CONTENT ssdeep	192:hZLLSPaLKGHnC//swsIwaocZ4J3u5uxTRWAwzDfS:nL6QHnC3swRZITJRWAwzDq

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b3333333c9cc6664
VISUAL aHash	e7e7e7ffe7e7ffff
VISUAL dHash	4d4d4d124c4d120a
VISUAL wHash	0707272f07072f3f
VISUAL colorHash	07200000030
VISUAL cropResistant	4d4d4d124c4d120a,33f4d989f9e5cdd9

Code Analysis

Risk Score 76/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer 🎣 Banking 🎣 Personal Info

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: Phishing
• Target: Nubank customers
• Method: Impersonation and deceptive website
• Exfil: Likely steals personal and financial information. The javascript obfuscation could be part of the exfiltration strategy.
• Indicators: Domain mismatch, recent domain, brand impersonation
• Risk: High

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
unicode_escape

🎯 Kit Endpoints

https://evilmartians.com/chronicles/postcss-8-plugin-migration`),m.env.LANG&&m.env.LANG.startsWith(
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/content-configuration#safelisting-classes
https://tailwindcss.com`}),...e.nodes])},container:(()=
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/content-configuration
https://mths.be/cssesc
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/content-configuration#discarding-classes
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/upgrade-guide#prefix-cannot-be-a-function
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/upgrade-guide#configure-content-sources
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/using-with-preprocessors#nesting
https://cdn.tailwindcss.com/
https://searchapi.dnnl.live/consulta?cpf=${cpf}&token_api=2077`
https://emprestimoliberado.com/aa/inicio/01/js/B7PYnCHDexx2.js
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/upgrade-guide#remove-dark-mode-configuration
https://www.w3ctech.com/topic/2226`));let
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/content-configuration#pattern-recommendations
https://twitter.com/browserslist
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/upgrade-guide#replace-variants-with-layer
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/installation

📡 API Calls Detected

POST

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Age

The domain is very recent.

Brand Impersonation

The website uses Nubank's branding to deceive users.

Suspicious Content (Loan Offer)

Offering loans is a common phishing tactic.

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Banking Credential Harvester

Target

Nubank users (International)

Attack Method

Brand impersonation + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

Risk Assessment

HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
18 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

Nubank

Official Website

https://nubank.com.br

Fake Service

Personal Loans

Fraudulent Claims

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Phishing (Brand Impersonation)

The attackers are attempting to trick users into providing their personal and financial information by impersonating Nubank and offering loans. They are using a look-alike website with a misleading domain.

Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation

The javascript obfuscation is designed to hide malicious code from detection tools and potentially deploy a keylogger or exfiltrate sensitive data

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

B7PYnCHDexx2.js

File Size

Functions: consultarCPF(), redirecionarParaChat(), processForm(), validateCPF()

📊 Attack Flow Diagram

1. Step 1: User lands on page with optional CPF in URL (pre-filled if present)
2. Step 2: User enters CPF and agrees to terms via processForm()
3. Step 3: consultarCPF() sends CPF to external API and receives full personal data (name, mother's name, birthdate, etc.)
4. Step 4: Data is displayed to user for 'confirmation' and stored in localStorage
5. Step 5: redirecionarParaChat() redirects to next phishing stage with all data preserved in localStorage and URL parameters
6. Step 6: Subsequent stages likely harvest banking credentials (not shown in this code)

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language

Portuguese (1%)

Total Code Size

411.1 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

6

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Moderate
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: User lands on page with optional CPF in URL (pre-filled if present)
2. Step 2: User enters CPF and agrees to terms via processForm()
3. Step 3: consultarCPF() sends CPF to external API and receives full personal data (name, mother's name, birthdate, etc.)
4. Step 4: Data is displayed to user for 'confirmation' and stored in localStorage
5. Step 5: redirecionarParaChat() redirects to next phishing stage with all data preserved in localStorage and URL parameters
6. Step 6: Subsequent stages likely harvest banking credentials (not shown in this code)