SafeMode - Analysis: tactica7.com.mx

Visual Capture

Detection Info

https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/index.php

Detected Brand

Plala

Country

International

Confidence

95%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

09a2837a-033…

Analyzed

2026-02-09 12:25

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1AD91EF1822853B4F999852A3C3752E94D3E1941EC7724D58A81EE72F1C8814EEC7F9FC
CONTENT ssdeep	96:A3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNr2t5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDY7YoDSZQ:j2kcRMgc0v

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b29e9a3131dccc99
VISUAL aHash	dfe7bdc3c3ffefff
VISUAL dHash	394c68049e600800
VISUAL wHash	1c243c3cc0d0fcfc
VISUAL colorHash	07018000600
VISUAL cropResistant	394c68049e600800

Code Analysis

Risk Score 59/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: Phishing
• Target: Plala users
• Method: Impersonation of login page.
• Exfil: cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php
• Indicators: Domain mismatch, obfuscated javascript, form action to suspicious PHP script
• Risk: High

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
hex_escape
base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

http://www.plala.or.jp/
https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/common.js
https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/tags.js

📤 Form Action Targets

cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch

The domain does not belong to Plala.

Javascript Obfuscation

Javascript code obfuscation indicates an attempt to hide malicious code.

Form Submission to suspicious URL

Form action is targeting to a suspicious PHP script that will likely steal credentials.

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Credential Harvesting Kit

Target

Plala users (International)

Attack Method

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

HTTP POST to backend

Risk Assessment

MEDIUM - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester
54 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

Plala

Official Website

plala.jp

Fake Service

Login

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker is attempting to steal user credentials by mimicking the Plala login page and redirecting the submitted information to a malicious server.

Secondary Method: Javascript Obfuscation

The javascript code on the page is obfuscated in an attempt to hide the malicious logic.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

common.js

File Size

Functions: tmx_post_session_params_fixed(), tmx_run_page_fingerprinting(), td_1B() - form data collection, td_5o() - iframe content access, td_3j() - initialization trigger

📊 Attack Flow Diagram

1. Step 1: Script loads and initializes fingerprinting components (td_3j)
2. Step 2: Collects browser/OS fingerprint via tmx_run_page_fingerprinting()
3. Step 3: Monitors form submissions and session data via td_1B()
4. Step 4: Encodes collected data using XOR obfuscation (td_5I)
5. Step 5: Creates hidden iframe for exfiltration (td_5o)
6. Step 6: Sends data via tmx_post_session_params_fixed() to attacker server
7. Step 7: Uses CSP nonce bypass to inject additional malicious scripts

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

99.1 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Moderate
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: Script loads and initializes fingerprinting components (td_3j)
2. Step 2: Collects browser/OS fingerprint via tmx_run_page_fingerprinting()
3. Step 3: Monitors form submissions and session data via td_1B()
4. Step 4: Encodes collected data using XOR obfuscation (td_5I)
5. Step 5: Creates hidden iframe for exfiltration (td_5o)
6. Step 6: Sends data via tmx_post_session_params_fixed() to attacker server
7. Step 7: Uses CSP nonce bypass to inject additional malicious scripts