Phishing Analysis
Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Visual Capture
Detection Info
http://nisha-interiors.com/plala.orr/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Detected Brand
Plala
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
3b7177e4-511…
Analyzed
2026-03-27 16:21
Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T19FA1001813853B4F99A552A3D3752E9493E2941EC7720D48A85EE72F1C8814EEC7FAFC |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
96:L3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNr2t5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDY7YoDSZHlHD:c2kcRMgc0Qj |
Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
b29e9a3131dccc99 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
dfe7bdc3c3ffefff |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
394c68049e600800 |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
1c243c3cc0d0fcfc |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
07018000600 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
394c68049e600800 |
Code Analysis
Risk Score
74/100
Threat Level
ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester
🎣 Banking
🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms
🔒 Obfuscation Detected
- fromCharCode
- hex_escape
- base64_strings
📤 Form Action Targets
- cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php
📊 Risk Score Breakdown
Total Risk Score
100/100
Contributing Factors
Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking
Credential Harvesting
Credential harvesting detected with 1 form(s) capturing sensitive data
Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 110 technique(s) to evade detection
🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis
Threat Type
Banking Credential Harvester
Target
Plala users
Attack Method
credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
HTTP POST to backend
Risk Assessment
HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend
⚠️ Indicators of Compromise
- Kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking
- 110 obfuscation techniques
🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis
Impersonated Brand
Plala
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Token swap/DEX platform
⚔️ Attack Methodology
Primary Method: Credential Harvesting
Victim enters username and password into fake login form. Credentials are captured via JavaScript and exfiltrated to attacker's server in real-time.
Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation
Malicious code is obfuscated using 110 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.
🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise
Domain Information
Domain
nisha-interiors.com
Registered
2023-09-09 18:44:23+00:00
Registrar
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Status
Active (older domain)
Hosting Information
Provider
GoDaddy
ASN
🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence
Similar Websites
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)
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Apr 01, 2026
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http://marutitraders99.com/plalaa/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Mar 31, 2026
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http://marutitraders99.com/plalaa/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Mar 30, 2026
Plala
https://mogahed.jo3.org//linkplala/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Mar 25, 2026
Scan History for nisha-interiors.com
Found 1 other scan for this domain
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