Phishing Analysis
Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Visual Capture
Detection Info
https://q-r.to/bgpl80
Detected Brand
Microsoft
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
3bca3ea7-683…
Analyzed
2026-05-30 05:16
Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T1F01254B195409D3B129386E4BA71AB0F73E58788CF432711BAF8539E1FC6CA1DC5A095 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
96:T4PuiEf8x3w+JxfPrxnqvwMQXRnMRHaRcu/wJ/Fx6/lOBhbzEvZDss8Mcr8QbHA2:dQnrfWaOSw7zEvysfcrvbWfLiwqgw |
Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
88087d7f63431737 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
00091f7fffffffff |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
b333fce118c00000 |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
0000000000000000 |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
060000001c0 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
b37ef90460000000,33b0b3b3b639f2c8 |
Code Analysis
Risk Score
71/100
Threat Level
ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester
🎣 Personal Info
🔒 Obfuscation Detected
- eval
- fromCharCode
📡 API Calls Detected
- POST
- //
📊 Risk Score Breakdown
Total Risk Score
100/100
Contributing Factors
Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: Credential Harvester, Personal Info
Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 36 technique(s) to evade detection
🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis
Threat Type
Credential Harvesting Kit
Target
Microsoft users
Attack Method
obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
⚠️ Indicators of Compromise
- Kit types: Credential Harvester, Personal Info
- 36 obfuscation techniques
🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis
Impersonated Brand
Microsoft
Official Website
https://www.microsoft.com
Fake Service
Credential harvesting service
⚔️ Attack Methodology
Primary Method: Credential Harvesting
Victim enters username and password into fake login form. Credentials are captured via JavaScript and exfiltrated to attacker's server in real-time.
Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation
Malicious code is obfuscated using 36 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.
🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise
Domain Information
Domain
q-r.to
Registered
2012-01-31 21:22:21+00:00
Registrar
Government of Kingdom of Tonga
Status
Active (older domain)
Hosting Information
Provider
Government of Kingdom of Tonga
ASN
🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence
Scan History for q-r.to
Found 10 other scans for this domain
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