EN ES PT

Phishing Analysis

Detailed analysis of captured phishing page

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Visual Capture

Screenshot of www.linktr.ee

Detection Info

http://www.linktr.ee/arhuxtable2/
Detected Brand
Rogers Communications
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
3c41d42d-627…
Analyzed
2026-07-31 22:17
Final URL (after redirects)
https://linktr.ee/arhuxtable2

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T156A3B5BB80631EFF0353C7C861A7B794929AE20AF4B14064D7CD175A6EC6D7BF481988
CONTENT ssdeep
1536:njtFvae8gfvPXjPNv9b0oC1+cbDJbVTJvjP8elye0TeyeKeHeCe4ekel1eieoe4o:nN0bPblV3LKWQB6

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
d80755f8750f0774
VISUAL aHash
18181818d8d8d8d8
VISUAL dHash
323070b2b2333232
VISUAL wHash
18383cbcd8d8d8fc
VISUAL colorHash
07200038000
VISUAL cropResistant
323070b2b2333232

Code Analysis

Risk Score 100/100
Threat Level ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer 🎣 Card Stealer 🎣 Banking 🎣 Personal Info

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

  • atob
  • eval
  • fromCharCode
  • unescape
  • unicode_escape
  • base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

  • https://linktr.ee/blog/how-many-followers-to-make-money-on-instagram
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/not-all-clicks-are-equal-a-year-of-linktree-traffic-by-source
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/how-to-add-a-linktree-to-your-tiktok-bio
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/how-to-add-multiple-links-to-instagram-bio
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/four-examples-of-great-linktrees-in-action
  • https://webmail-shaws-logins-s-zimbra.framer.website
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/ariana-grande-brings-petal-to-life-on-linktree
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/linktree-non-profits-charities
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/automate-instagram-dm-replies-with-linktree
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/linktree-amazon-benefits
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/linktree-podcast-pulse-april-2026
  • https://linktr.ee/?utm_source=linktree&utm_medium=profile&utm_campaign=footer_logo_cta&utm_content=arhuxtable2
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/share-streaming-music-link-on-linktree
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/joy-and-vigilance-a-pride-reflection
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/your-bio-link-is-the-internets-busiest-intersection
  • https://linktr.ee/blog
  • https://linktr.ee/blogs/categories/success-stories
  • https://linktr.ee/blog/linktree-enhances-insights-chat-with-personalized-data-driven-recommendations

📡 API Calls Detected

  • https://snapchat.com/scan?attachmentUrl=
  • POST
  • https://linktr.ee/try/admin?utm_source=linktree&utm_medium=profile&utm_campaign=footer_logo_cta&utm_content=
  • GET
  • /api/profiles/validation/subscribe-unlock
  • /api/profiles/geo
  • /api/profiles/avatars/fetch?
  • https://api.odesli.co/
  • /api/profiles/media-kit/

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
Credential Harvesting
Credential harvesting detected with 3 form(s) capturing sensitive data
Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 307 technique(s) to evade detection

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Banking Credential Harvester
Target
Rogers Communications users
Attack Method
credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
  • 307 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
Rogers Communications
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Banking/payment service

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

Victim enters username and password into fake login form. Credentials are captured via JavaScript and exfiltrated to attacker's server in real-time.

Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation

Malicious code is obfuscated using 307 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

Domain Information

Domain
www.linktr.ee
Registered
2016-03-08 21:02:27+02:00
Registrar
Zone Media OÜ
Status
Active (older domain)

Hosting Information

Provider
Zone Media OÜ
ASN

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

Scan History for www.linktr.ee

Found 4 other scans for this domain

😰
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