Phishing Analysis
Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Visual Capture
Detection Info
https://rebrand.ly/Danaaid-lndonesia
Detected Brand
DANA
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
4c2455a2-623…
Analyzed
2026-06-29 01:26
Final URL (after redirects)
https://webxtestx.adsxid.biz.id/xne/f/pin.html
Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T1F5B15391E114AC37160B09E4A5EA7F0820F7C35AC7142819A2F44AE7AFD6F40CB75E6A |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
96:Tmn2+WIdcuqu744Do3aN3Bh/W6czLLac/B9R:6mEDqzn7R |
Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
cc33676631cc3333 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
0018181818181800 |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
083232323232320c |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
000000001c0 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
20aaaad5e6a2b424,083232323232320c |
Code Analysis
Risk Score
89/100
Threat Level
ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester
🎣 OTP Stealer
🎣 Banking
🔒 Obfuscation Detected
- fromCharCode
- unescape
- document.write
📡 API Calls Detected
- POST
📊 Risk Score Breakdown
Total Risk Score
100/100
Contributing Factors
Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Banking
Credential Harvesting
Credential harvesting detected with 5 form(s) capturing sensitive data
Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 6 technique(s) to evade detection
🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis
Threat Type
Banking Credential Harvester
Target
DANA users
Attack Method
credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
⚠️ Indicators of Compromise
- Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Banking
- 6 obfuscation techniques
🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis
Impersonated Brand
DANA
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Banking/payment service
⚔️ Attack Methodology
Primary Method: Credential Harvesting
Victim enters username and password into fake login form. Credentials are captured via JavaScript and exfiltrated to attacker's server in real-time.
Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation
Malicious code is obfuscated using 6 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.
🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise
Domain Information
Domain
rebrand.ly
Registered
2014-09-12 22:00:00+00:00
Registrar
Libyan Spider Network (int)
Status
Active (older domain)
Hosting Information
Provider
Libyan Spider Network (int)
ASN
🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence
Similar Websites
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)
Scan History for rebrand.ly
Found 10 other scans for this domain
-
https://rebrand.ly/0a2h7q8
https://rebrand.ly/nl-nl-nl
https://rebrand.ly/j8kbuzg
https://rebrand.ly/afydgps
https://||rebrand.ly/mobilepay-dk^$all/
https://||rebrand.ly/kg0at8b^$all/
https://||rebrand.ly/a3cc0b^$all/
https://||rebrand.ly/danaa-lndonesia^$all/
https://rebrand.ly/Danaa-lndonesia
https://||rebrand.ly/mysticals^$all/
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