EN ES PT
Back to Stats

Visual Capture

Screenshot of linktr.ee

Detection Info

http://linktr.ee/shaw747
Detected Brand
Shaw
Country
Canada
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
4f0f894b-244โ€ฆ
Analyzed
2026-02-08 11:37
Final URL (after redirects)
https://linktr.ee/shaw747

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T1FAA3D7BF94121CEF1353D7A410FB6F98636ED70BB43144A0D3D89BAD2C9293FA142A56
CONTENT ssdeep
1536:Q7fbJY0Ce9Bhh95ndDF+SkbhfTq9ex4gZR2aV8S/tjoff1mwQu:QGGPgDV/Giu

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
d80337f8dd880df4
VISUAL aHash
18181898d8d8d8d8
VISUAL dHash
302872b232b13232
VISUAL wHash
181838fcfcdcd8d8
VISUAL colorHash
070000001c0
VISUAL cropResistant
302872b232b13232

Code Analysis

Risk Score 100/100
Threat Level ALTO
โš ๏ธ Phishing Confirmed
๐ŸŽฃ Credential Harvester ๐ŸŽฃ OTP Stealer ๐ŸŽฃ Card Stealer ๐ŸŽฃ Banking ๐ŸŽฃ Personal Info

๐Ÿ”ฌ Threat Analysis Report

โ€ข Threat: Impersonation
โ€ข Target: Shaw customers
โ€ข Method: Linktree link pretending to be Shaw
โ€ข Exfil: Potentially harvesting credentials or other information
โ€ข Indicators: Hosted on linktree, urgent update, suspicious CTA
โ€ข Risk: High

๐Ÿ”’ Obfuscation Detected

  • atob
  • eval
  • fromCharCode
  • unescape
  • unicode_escape
  • base64_strings

๐ŸŽฏ Kit Endpoints

  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlCtOMKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.24.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlCmOQKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.18.woff2)
  • https://linktr.ee/s/privacy
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlCwOUKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.93.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/nanumpenscript/v19/daaDSSYiLGqEal3MvdA_FOL_3FkN2zv-bsFDKyaJmnaqpyFsC7o88twkM26lro8.74.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlCmOQKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.116.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gaegu/v17/TuGfUVB6Up9NU6ZOod4zyIF3DVtbW7e3tycOO3kDaENwkBQC.45.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/heptaslab/v23/ea8cadoyU_jkHdalebHv42llhHCXA3A.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlCmOQKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.93.woff2)
  • https://securepubads.g.doubleclick.net/tag/js/gpt.js
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/viaodalibre/v19/vEFW2_lWCgoR6OKuRz9kcRV5ZmgZ6tM.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/raleway/v29/1Ptxg8zYS_SKggPN4iEgvnHyvveLxVvaorCIPrEVIT9d0c8.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/nanumpenscript/v19/daaDSSYiLGqEal3MvdA_FOL_3FkN2zv-bsFDKyaJmnaqpyFsC7o88twkM26lro8.107.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlC0OIKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.103.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gaegu/v17/TuGfUVB6Up9NU6ZOod4zyIF3DVtbW7e3tycOO3kDaENwkBQC.48.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/bebasneue/v14/JTUSjIg69CK48gW7PXoo9WlhyyTh89Y.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlCmOQKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.56.woff2)
  • https://api.odesli.co/
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlCtOMKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.52.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlCmOQKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.100.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlC0OIKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.5.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/spacegrotesk/v21/V8mDoQDjQSkFtoMM3T6r8E7mPbF4C_k3HqU.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/librebaskerville/v14/kmKnZrc3Hgbbcjq75U4uslyuy4kn0qNZaxMaC82U.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gaegu/v17/TuGfUVB6Up9NU6ZOod4zyIF3DVtbW7e3tycOO3kDaENwkBQC.47.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gaegu/v17/TuGfUVB6Up9NU6ZOod4zyIF3DVtbW7e3tycOO3kDaENwkBQC.41.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v30/KFOlCnqEu92Fr1MmWUlfCxc4AMP6lbBP.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gothica1/v13/CSR44z5ZnPydRjlCCwlC0OIKTfl8tORnAWCmQF9eP3_Jw8Kq0NHbEvCS7w.53.woff2)
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/nanumpenscript/v19/daaDSSYiLGqEal3MvdA_FOL_3FkN2zv-bsFDKyaJmnaqpyFsC7o88twkM26lro8.113.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/gaegu/v17/TuGfUVB6Up9NU6ZOod4zyIF3DVtbW7e3tycOO3kDaENwkBQC.13.woff2)format(
  • https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/alfaslabone/v20/6NUQ8FmMKwSEKjnm5-4v-4Jh2dxhe-Wv.woff2)format(
  • https://linktr.ee/?utm_source=linktree&utm_medium=profile&utm_campaign=footer_logo_cta&utm_content=shaw747
  • https://assets.production.linktr.ee/profiles/_next/static/logo-assets/site.webmanifest

๐Ÿ“ก API Calls Detected

  • https://api.odesli.co/
  • https://snapchat.com/scan?attachmentUrl=
  • POST
  • /api/profiles/spring/
  • /api/profiles/payment/linktree/listing?
  • GET

๐Ÿ“Š Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain unrelated to brand and hosted on linktree
Linktree is often used for phishing attacks, and the domain does not match Shaw's official domain
Impersonation
Claims to be Shaw, using its logo, but is not their official site
Suspicious call to action and language
Uses urgent language and requests users to sign in without providing context

๐Ÿ”ฌ Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Banking Credential Harvester
Target
Shaw users (Canada)
Attack Method
Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

โš ๏ธ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
  • 857 obfuscation techniques

๐Ÿข Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
Shaw
Official Website
https://www.shaw.ca/
Fake Service
Shaw Account login

Fraudulent Claims

โš”๏ธ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker likely directs users to a fake login page that mimics the Shaw login, designed to steal the user's login credentials. Once the user enters their information, it is sent to the attacker.

๐ŸŒ Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

๐Ÿฆ  Malicious Files

Main File
create.js
File Size

๐Ÿ”ฌ JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language
English (1%)
Sophistication Level
Basic
Total Code Size
3.9ย MB

๐Ÿ”— API Endpoints Detected

Other
86

๐Ÿ” Obfuscation Detected

  • : Moderate
  • : None
  • : None
  • : Moderate
  • : Light
  • : Heavy
  • : Light
  • : Heavy
  • : Light
  • : Light
  • : Light
  • : None
  • : Light
  • : None
  • : Moderate
  • : Light
  • : None
  • : Light

๐Ÿค– AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

๐ŸŽฏ Malicious Files Identified

Main Drainer
create.js
File Size
4030KB
๐Ÿ˜ฐ
"I Never Thought It Would Happen to Me"
That's what 2.3 million victims say every year. Don't wait to become a statistic.