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Visual Capture

Screenshot of seguroliberado.com

Detection Info

https://seguroliberado.com/
Detected Brand
NuBank (Nubank)
Country
International
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
50b26135-7b1โ€ฆ
Analyzed
2026-02-14 03:52

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T1A47273B28318B6BE64DBCAE4AE2A733A5156D04BF9E6114151FD8778C7C3CC0EE27540
CONTENT ssdeep
192:wWdYuDkdT49zG7zToJ0sq3/bTpxIIIImucpqpxIIIImiEZp/VtdwoIq5K65Jn:wWYuDk1MJZN9ndwoIqw2Jn

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
990ce6f3cc88e6e2
VISUAL aHash
00000000ffffffff
VISUAL dHash
d7b3d7b3b25c5a0c
VISUAL wHash
00000000ffffffff
VISUAL colorHash
06000000038
VISUAL cropResistant
000405151505048a,b2325a5a5a5a120c,f7f3b3f3f3d7b3b2

Code Analysis

Risk Score 100/100
Threat Level ALTO
โš ๏ธ Phishing Confirmed
๐ŸŽฃ Credential Harvester ๐ŸŽฃ OTP Stealer ๐ŸŽฃ Card Stealer ๐ŸŽฃ Personal Info

๐Ÿ”ฌ Threat Analysis Report

โ€ข Threat: Phishing
โ€ข Target: NuBank (Nubank)
โ€ข Method: Impersonation using a look-alike website.
โ€ข Exfil: Unknown, likely to steal credentials and financial data
โ€ข Indicators: Recent domain, domain mismatch, visual similarity, obfuscated javascript.
โ€ข Risk: High

๐Ÿ”’ Obfuscation Detected

  • eval
  • fromCharCode
  • unescape
  • base64_strings

๐ŸŽฏ Kit Endpoints

  • http://developers.facebook.com/policy/].
  • https://www.facebook.com/privacy_sandbox/pixel/register/trigger/
  • https://api.vturb.com.br
  • https://connect.facebook.net/
  • https://connect.facebook.net/en_US/fbevents.js
  • https://api6.ipify.org?format=json
  • https://cdn.utmify.com.br/scripts/utms/latest.js
  • https://connect.facebook.net/log/fbevents_telemetry/
  • https://developers.facebook.com/docs/meta-pixel/reference/
  • https://www.facebook.com/tr
  • https://www.instagram.com/tr/
  • https://www.facebook.com/privacy_sandbox/topics/registration/
  • https://gw.conversionsapigateway.com
  • https://www.facebook.com/tr/
  • https://cdn.utmify.com.br/scripts/pixel/pixel-google.js
  • https://analytics.tiktok.com/i18n/pixel/events.js
  • https://api.ipify.org?format=json
  • https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/js-sha256/src/sha256.min.js
  • https://ipapi.co/json/
  • https://tracking.utmify.com.br/tracking/v1
  • https://developers.facebook.com/docs/ads-for-websites/pixel-events/#events
  • https://wa.me/
  • http://localhost:3001/tracking/v1
  • https://wa.me/${o}?${e.split(

๐Ÿ“ก API Calls Detected

  • https://ipapi.co/json/

๐Ÿ“Š Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
90/100

Contributing Factors

Recent Domain
The domain is very new (1 day old) which is typical for phishing sites.
Domain Mismatch
The domain name does not match the brand being impersonated (nubank.com.br vs seguroliberado.com).
Obfuscated Javascript
Obfuscation of javascript makes it hard to identify the actual intent of the website.
Impersonation
The visual similarity to the NuBank branding increases the chance that users will fall victim to the scam.

๐Ÿ”ฌ Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Banking Credential Harvester
Target
NuBank (Nubank) users (International)
Attack Method
Brand impersonation + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

โš ๏ธ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Personal Info
  • 120 obfuscation techniques

๐Ÿข Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
NuBank (Nubank)
Official Website
nubank.com.br
Fake Service
Credit Offer

Fraudulent Claims

โš”๏ธ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The phishing site is designed to steal user credentials (username and password) by tricking users into entering them on a fake login page that closely resembles the genuine NuBank website.

Secondary Method: Malware distribution (potential)

Once a user logs in, they can be redirected to a page that downloads malware.

๐ŸŒ Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

๐Ÿฆ  Malicious Files

Main File
fbevents.js
File Size

๐Ÿ”ฌ JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language
English (1%)
Sophistication Level
Basic
Total Code Size
403.0ย KB

๐Ÿ”— API Endpoints Detected

Other
15

๐Ÿ” Obfuscation Detected

  • : Moderate
  • : Light
  • : Light

๐Ÿค– AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

๐ŸŽฏ Malicious Files Identified

Main Drainer
fbevents.js
File Size
403KB

Similar Websites

Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)

๐Ÿ˜ฐ
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