Phishing Analysis
Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Visual Capture
Detection Info
https://pu.slna.cc/
Detected Brand
Pump Fun
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
73ec31ca-988…
Analyzed
2026-03-23 07:41
Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T11F22A5F26580702F6157C3C99F266BBD73A651E7E6D6010157FCC789CA8BC82EE0B944 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
192:dCi440FAAqRZ61bmpKRyp+40rAAqRZ64oGQls+ec:UM0IRZ61bm7P0eRZ63ls+x |
Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
d3938cacb0939ea6 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
7e646c6c60181800 |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
f4ccc9c9cc3270b2 |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
ff7e7c6c04183c18 |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
31030000600 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
762c99f2c0808183,f4ccc9c9cc3270b2 |
Code Analysis
Risk Score
68/100
Threat Level
ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 OTP Stealer
🎣 Personal Info
🔒 Obfuscation Detected
- unescape
🎯 Kit Endpoints
- #blog
📡 API Calls Detected
- POST
- https://api.binance.com/api/v3/ticker/price?symbol=PUMPUSDT
📊 Risk Score Breakdown
Total Risk Score
100/100
Contributing Factors
Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: OTP Stealer, Personal Info
Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 2 technique(s) to evade detection
🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis
Threat Type
Two-Factor Authentication Stealer
Target
Pump Fun users
Attack Method
obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
⚠️ Indicators of Compromise
- Kit types: OTP Stealer, Personal Info
- 2 obfuscation techniques
🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis
Impersonated Brand
Pump Fun
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Credential harvesting service
⚔️ Attack Methodology
Primary Method: Two-Factor Authentication Bypass
Victim is prompted for 2FA code after entering credentials. The code is intercepted and used by attacker to access victim's account in real-time.
Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation
Malicious code is obfuscated using 2 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.
🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise
Domain Information
Domain
pu.slna.cc
Registered
2026-03-07 21:01:36+00:00
Registrar
NICENIC INTERNATIONAL GROUP CO., LIMITED
Status
Recently registered (15 days old)
Hosting Information
Provider
NICENIC INTERNATIONAL GROUP CO., LIMITED
ASN
🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence
Similar Websites
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)
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