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Phishing Analysis

Detailed analysis of captured phishing page

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Visual Capture

Screenshot of zum.csam.in

Detection Info

http://zum.csam.in/page/Garenaffteam/x-3page/
Detected Brand
Garena Free Fire
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
85c36eaf-af3…
Analyzed
2026-05-28 10:09
Final URL (after redirects)
https://zum.csam.in/page/Garenaffteam/x-3page/

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T10B0275B2C13B45BA01BAC7E29BBB275533D08169F603425B8BFD53AD89CCC55FE051A2
CONTENT ssdeep
96:TGVuwzbrXrYo1roAYo1roHPOPfuX1kckFYrzV4oooodckRZpDRw9buzucxV:uz3rYIrtYIr0us1CF4sccxV

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
9b9b646434c79b38
VISUAL aHash
a03c3c3c0c1c1000
VISUAL dHash
4d69696979716169
VISUAL wHash
ff3c3c3c3c3c3c00
VISUAL colorHash
30001010040
VISUAL cropResistant
3efcfefcdcaeecdc,9898908080f8819b,72d6b3f8f8fcee9a,4d69696979716169

Code Analysis

Risk Score 3/100
Threat Level ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

  • unescape

📡 API Calls Detected

  • POST

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
40/100

Contributing Factors

Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 2 technique(s) to evade detection

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Garena Free Fire Phishing Landing Page
Target
Garena Free Fire users
Attack Method
obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
LOW - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

  • 2 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
Garena Free Fire
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Credential harvesting service

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Brand Impersonation Redirect

Impersonates Garena Free Fire to build victim trust through search engine manipulation or malicious advertisements. Often redirects to credential theft pages or serves malware disguised as legitimate software.

Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation

Malicious code is obfuscated using 2 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

Domain Information

Domain
zum.csam.in
Registered
2026-05-16 09:15:40.381000+00:00
Registrar
HOSTINGER operations, UAB
Status
Recently registered (12 days old)

Hosting Information

Provider
Hostinger
ASN

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

😰
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