SafeMode - Analysis: aik.chase998.uk.cc

Visual Capture

Detection Info

http://aik.chase998.uk.cc

Detected Brand

Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, Gmarket, 11ST, Olive Young, Lotte ON

Country

South Korea

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

87a37f1a-79b…

Analyzed

2026-01-26 09:44

Final URL (after redirects)

http://aik.chase998.uk.cc/index/index/home.html

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1D6921A29B54E5C62DF33C4C2A4E02D273499E3078A2A09E15BD905B59FD3CF0B989FB4
CONTENT ssdeep	96:YiryG1T0aP6kpxhHQEsW3wSUPVRUGrkE5K8VzQ/96DeLa1k+fyc2Cm/zSWtILOPo:Yi7TpAExrakOUz+yoVX/0/6

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	dcdd73f1e6260809
VISUAL aHash	e7fc181818180000
VISUAL dHash	0f32b3333332440e
VISUAL wHash	ffff3c3c3c3c0000
VISUAL colorHash	39600008200
VISUAL cropResistant	06066669c30f0684,0008bc98b9b7bc9d,0f00000000000008,a6a294554d3931c2,0f32b3333332440e

Code Analysis

Risk Score 68/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: E-commerce commission scam phishing
• Target: Users in South Korea, targeting victims with Korean e-commerce brands
• Method: Scam claiming to offer commissions by processing orders after initial deposit
• Exfil: Unknown, but likely harvesting personal/financial information
• Indicators: Misleading commissions claims, unknown domain, deposit required
• Risk: HIGH - Risk of financial loss, personal data theft

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit

Detected Credential Harvester and OTP Stealer kits with real-time form interception capabilities.

Brand Impersonation

Impersonates multiple high-profile e-commerce brands (Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, Gmarket, 11ST, Olive Young, Lotte ON) to deceive victims.

Obfuscation Techniques

Detected 2 obfuscation techniques in JavaScript files, complicating analysis and detection evasion.

Suspicious Claims

Promises commissions for processing orders and requires a minimum deposit of 100,000 KRW, indicating financial fraud.

Malicious JavaScript

Inclusion of JavaScript file (swiper-bundle.min.js) with potential obfuscation, totaling 0.14 MB in size.

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Two-Factor Authentication Stealer

Target

Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, Gmarket, 11ST, Olive Young, Lotte ON users (South Korea)

Attack Method

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

Unknown

Risk Assessment

HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with Unknown

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer
2 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, Gmarket, 11ST, Olive Young, Lotte ON

Official Website

https://www.coupang.com, https://www.ssg.com, https://www.aliexpress.com, https://www.gmarket.co.kr, https://www.11st.co.kr, https://www.oliveyoung.co.kr, https://www.lotteon.com

Fake Service

Commission-based order processing

Fraudulent Claims

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The phishing kit captures user credentials through fake login forms mimicking e-commerce platforms. Submitted data is likely exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server for account takeover or financial fraud.

Secondary Method: OTP Stealer

The kit includes functionality to intercept one-time passwords (OTPs) sent to victims, enabling attackers to bypass two-factor authentication and gain unauthorized access to accounts.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

Domain Information

Domain

aik.chase998.uk.cc

Registered

1997-10-13 04:00:00+00:00

Registrar

Gname.com Pte. Ltd.

Status

Active (10332 days old)

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

File Size

JavaScript file with potential obfuscation, associated with the phishing kit.

📊 Attack Flow Diagram

Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. TARGET RECEIVES PHISHING LURE                          │
│    - Fake email/SMS with malicious link                  │
│    - Mimics Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, etc. branding     │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. VICTIM LANDS ON FAKE SITE                             │
│    - Clone of legitimate e-commerce login page           │
│    - Requests user credentials                           │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. CREDENTIAL INPUT                                      │
│    - User enters username/password                       │
│    - Form appears identical to real site                 │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION                                     │
│    - Credentials sent via HTTP POST                      │
│    - Standard form submission to attacker server         │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

139.7 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Light

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. TARGET RECEIVES PHISHING LURE                          │
│    - Fake email/SMS with malicious link                  │
│    - Mimics Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, etc. branding     │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. VICTIM LANDS ON FAKE SITE                             │
│    - Clone of legitimate e-commerce login page           │
│    - Requests user credentials                           │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. CREDENTIAL INPUT                                      │
│    - User enters username/password                       │
│    - Form appears identical to real site                 │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION                                     │
│    - Credentials sent via HTTP POST                      │
│    - Standard form submission to attacker server         │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```