EN ES PT
Back to Stats

Visual Capture

Screenshot of www.it-communications.com

Detection Info

https://www.it-communications.com/?urid=QekUmAG1SKGCkVrFPcR7Eqgokar-cNrSxukpyx-1K3LBQkmgea2AJpYeUbJVQRzZ6UgCDUzOFSYPiiEdcf4E3w8tmvDhQzuQeFOk8WuvCxvTf62ExBUM23yoiDyZ7k5GBXjdhl019NTEWM&rg=CUS
Detected Brand
Microsoft
Country
International
Confidence
95%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
b115c95b-d89โ€ฆ
Analyzed
2026-02-07 23:11

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T15DC15060E424DD338353D6E1BBA49B0A72D8C347CA46450866F8536E6FE3DD5CE261A1
CONTENT ssdeep
96:11RrAPn8G36sgCD6sTUxSNgEj6sTzX1p6sIGUJvySOzrG4vSAKyFSAb3+3pxRHUR:al9D+cVPpYgDS3RHAN3/

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
989973674c5932dc
VISUAL aHash
ffff3e1818000000
VISUAL dHash
f0f8f0b2b2f1dab0
VISUAL wHash
ffffff1c180c0800
VISUAL colorHash
1bc00010000
VISUAL cropResistant
e0e0f0f0c0e0c0c1,f0f8f0b2b2f1dab0

Code Analysis

Risk Score 56/100
Threat Level ALTO
โš ๏ธ Phishing Confirmed
๐ŸŽฃ Credential Harvester

๐Ÿ”ฌ Threat Analysis Report

โ€ข Threat: Credential Phishing
โ€ข Target: Microsoft users
โ€ข Method: Impersonation through a fake login page.
โ€ข Exfil: Unknown, but forms detected (likely harvesting credentials).
โ€ข Indicators: Domain mismatch, form asking for sensitive information.
โ€ข Risk: High

๐Ÿ”’ Obfuscation Detected

  • fromCharCode
  • base64_strings

๐ŸŽฏ Kit Endpoints

  • https://breeze.aimon.applicationinsights.io/v2/track
  • https://www.it-communications.com/js/site2.js
  • https://az416426.vo.msecnd.net/scripts/a/ai.0.js
  • https://dc-int.services.visualstudio.com/v2/track
  • https://dc.services.visualstudio.com/v2/track
  • https://www.it-communications.com/js/reporter_v8.js?ver=1.10.0

๐Ÿ“ก API Calls Detected

  • POST

๐Ÿ“Š Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch
The domain it-communications.com is completely unrelated to Microsoft.
Credential Harvesting
Form is designed to collect user credentials.
Obfuscation
Obfuscation detected in the code, likely to hide malicious intent or techniques.

๐Ÿ”ฌ Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Credential Harvesting Kit
Target
Microsoft users (International)
Attack Method
Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
MEDIUM - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

โš ๏ธ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester
  • 9 obfuscation techniques

๐Ÿข Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
Microsoft
Official Website
https://www.microsoft.com
Fake Service
Microsoft account login

โš”๏ธ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker attempts to steal user credentials by mimicking a legitimate login page. Users are prompted to enter their Microsoft account information on the fake page, which is then captured by the attacker.

Secondary Method: Obfuscation

The JavaScript code is obfuscated to make it difficult to analyze and detect malicious activity.

๐ŸŒ Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

๐Ÿฆ  Malicious Files

Main File
reporter_v8.js
File Size

Functions: sendData(), postData(), getMessageData(), crajsonpcallback(), reshapeCode(), unMinifyUrl(), addTrackerImage()

๐Ÿ“Š Attack Flow Diagram

1. Step 1: Victim visits URL with 'urid' parameter (victim identifier)
2. Step 2: Script initializes and extracts URL parameters (urid, rid, cid, uid)
3. Step 3: Script tracks all user interactions (keystrokes, clicks, form submissions) via event listeners
4. Step 4: For each interaction, sendData() exfiltrates data to C2 via 'getresponse.getmainpoint' with custom headers
5. Step 5: getMessageData() fetches dynamic phishing content based on interaction type (e.g., type 5 for form submissions)
6. Step 6: crajsonpcallback() injects fetched content into DOM (#omContent)
7. Step 7: If AJAX fails, addTrackerImage() sends data via 1x1 pixel image
8. Step 8: On successful exfiltration, server may respond with redirect URL (window.location.replace)
9. Step 9: Conditional alerts/modals shown based on server responses (e.g., fake training links, company names)

๐Ÿ”ฌ JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language
English (1%)
Total Code Size
113.6ย KB

๐Ÿ”— API Endpoints Detected

Other
3

๐Ÿ” Obfuscation Detected

  • : None
  • : None
  • : Moderate

๐Ÿค– AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

๐Ÿ“Š Attack Flow

1. Step 1: Victim visits URL with 'urid' parameter (victim identifier)
2. Step 2: Script initializes and extracts URL parameters (urid, rid, cid, uid)
3. Step 3: Script tracks all user interactions (keystrokes, clicks, form submissions) via event listeners
4. Step 4: For each interaction, sendData() exfiltrates data to C2 via 'getresponse.getmainpoint' with custom headers
5. Step 5: getMessageData() fetches dynamic phishing content based on interaction type (e.g., type 5 for form submissions)
6. Step 6: crajsonpcallback() injects fetched content into DOM (#omContent)
7. Step 7: If AJAX fails, addTrackerImage() sends data via 1x1 pixel image
8. Step 8: On successful exfiltration, server may respond with redirect URL (window.location.replace)
9. Step 9: Conditional alerts/modals shown based on server responses (e.g., fake training links, company names)

๐ŸŽฏ Malicious Files Identified

Main Drainer
reporter_v8.js
File Size
~20KB (based on provided code)
Malicious Functions
  • sendData()
  • postData()
  • getMessageData()
  • crajsonpcallback()
  • reshapeCode()
  • unMinifyUrl()
  • addTrackerImage()
๐Ÿ˜ฐ
"I Never Thought It Would Happen to Me"
That's what 2.3 million victims say every year. Don't wait to become a statistic.