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Visual Capture

Screenshot of smtp.natrajstonex.co.in

Detection Info

http://smtp.natrajstonex.co.in/
Detected Brand
Unknown
Country
International
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
bb62bb8b-a58โ€ฆ
Analyzed
2026-02-11 00:10

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T1F49133215015AE3351E386F4B6DDDB6362EFC228CF802C5822FCC6AD0BD5C51A67B959
CONTENT ssdeep
96:yZ/OypIVgExhqBQE9tFMhTFk6aMhTtk6Yt:yZ/OBgihqQE9tFMhTFk6aMhTtk6k

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
9999996666668b33
VISUAL aHash
1818181800000000
VISUAL dHash
b2b2b2b24c200000
VISUAL wHash
fcfcfcfc00000000
VISUAL colorHash
070000001c0
VISUAL cropResistant
a2a2e2a296a89696,b2b2b2b24c200000

Code Analysis

Risk Score 85/100
Threat Level ALTO
โš ๏ธ Phishing Confirmed
๐ŸŽฃ Credential Harvester ๐ŸŽฃ OTP Stealer ๐ŸŽฃ Personal Info

๐Ÿ”ฌ Threat Analysis Report

โ€ข Threat: Phishing
โ€ข Target: Credentials
โ€ข Method: Impersonation
โ€ข Exfil: /?_task=login
โ€ข Indicators: Unusual domain, generic form, obfuscation
โ€ข Risk: High

๐Ÿ” Credential Harvesting Forms

๐Ÿ”’ Obfuscation Detected

  • atob
  • eval
  • fromCharCode
  • unescape
  • document.write
  • unicode_escape
  • base64_strings

๐ŸŽฏ Kit Endpoints

  • http://idn.icann.org/E-mail_test)
  • https://mathiasbynens.be/notes/javascript-encoding
  • http://smtp.natrajstonex.co.in/program/js/common.js?s=1769006884
  • http://smtp.natrajstonex.co.in/plugins/skins/punycode.js?s=1728655216
  • /?_task=login
  • plugins/skins/login.css?s=1728655216
  • https://code.iamcal.com/php/rfc822/
  • http://smtp.natrajstonex.co.in/program/js/jstz.min.js?s=1769006884
  • https://rumkin.com
  • http://dev.rubyonrails.org/changeset/7271
  • https://mths.be/punycode
  • http://smtp.natrajstonex.co.in/skins/elastic/ui.js?s=1728679525
  • http://www.michaelapproved.com/articles/timezone-detect-and-ignore-daylight-saving-time-dst/
  • http://smtp.natrajstonex.co.in/program/js/app.js?s=1769006884
  • http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3492#section-3.4
  • http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

๐Ÿ“ค Form Action Targets

  • /?_task=login

๐Ÿ“Š Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
90/100

Contributing Factors

Unusual Domain Name
The domain does not appear to be associated with any legitimate brand or service.
Generic Login Form
The login form lacks branding, making it highly suspicious.
JavaScript Obfuscation
Obfuscated Javascript is often used to hide malicious activity.
Form Submission
Form actions detected - likely exfiltration attempt

๐Ÿ”ฌ Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Two-Factor Authentication Stealer
Target
General public
Attack Method
credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
HTTP POST to backend
Risk Assessment
CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

โš ๏ธ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Personal Info
  • 67 obfuscation techniques

๐Ÿข Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
Unknown
Fake Service
Generic login (likely an attempt to steal credentials for various services)

โš”๏ธ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker is attempting to steal login credentials through a fake login form hosted on a suspicious domain. The form likely submits the stolen credentials to the attacker.

๐ŸŒ Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

๐Ÿฆ  Malicious Files

Main File
common.js?s=1769006884
File Size

Functions: enable_command_handler, http_post, http_request, rcmail.login, rcmail.send_mail, $('form').submit(function () { ... })

๐Ÿ“Š Attack Flow Diagram

1. Step 1: User visits cloned Roundcube Webmail site (natrajstonex.co.in)
2. Step 2: User enters credentials in the login form (#rcmloginuser, #rcmloginpwd)
3. Step 3: Form submission is intercepted via $('form').submit() handler
4. Step 4: Credentials are captured and sent via http_post or http_request to the attacker's server
5. Step 5: User is potentially redirected to the legitimate Roundcube Webmail or shown a fake error to avoid suspicion

๐Ÿ”ฌ JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language
English (1%)
Total Code Size
505.1ย KB

๐Ÿ”— API Endpoints Detected

Other
9

๐Ÿ” Obfuscation Detected

  • : Moderate
  • : Light
  • : Light
  • : None
  • : Light

๐Ÿค– AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

๐Ÿ“Š Attack Flow

1. Step 1: User visits cloned Roundcube Webmail site (natrajstonex.co.in)
2. Step 2: User enters credentials in the login form (#rcmloginuser, #rcmloginpwd)
3. Step 3: Form submission is intercepted via $('form').submit() handler
4. Step 4: Credentials are captured and sent via http_post or http_request to the attacker's server
5. Step 5: User is potentially redirected to the legitimate Roundcube Webmail or shown a fake error to avoid suspicion

๐ŸŽฏ Malicious Files Identified

Main Drainer
common.js?s=1769006884
Malicious Functions
  • enable_command_handler
  • http_post
  • http_request
  • rcmail.login
  • rcmail.send_mail
  • $('form').submit(function () { ... })

Scan History for smtp.natrajstonex.co.in

Found 2 other scans for this domain

๐Ÿ˜ฐ
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