Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
No screenshot available
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T1A7541ABFA32452F9E106D7DCD952E038326E24FE3B5283A8E7594F36B5148DC8855D83 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
1536:Ps8Ucshc9BoUpQ5LToi0ZvqLDTKc9BoUpQ5RyiyOYjyty2ByayMc0OWIbZaHeYNt:P8c9HQKc9HQthc0y65s6 |
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
929979a6a66da496 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
163c5c003e36283c |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
a4d8d8e4e4c4d8dc |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
1e3c5c243e7e2c3c |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
38006000200 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
727130d2c96b72f2,a4d8d8e4e4c4d8dc |
โข Threat: No immediate threat detected
โข Target: None identified
โข Method: Legitimate business website
โข Exfil: No data exfiltration detected
โข Indicators: Domain matches brand, complete website
โข Risk: LOW - Legitimate business site
The phishing kit captures user credentials (email and password) via form fields on the fake login page. Data is likely exfiltrated in real-time via WebSocket connections to an attacker-controlled server.
The kit includes modules for intercepting one-time passwords (OTP) and stealing payment card details, enabling account takeover and financial fraud.
Large, obfuscated JavaScript file likely containing credential harvesting and data exfiltration logic.
Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:
```
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 1. INITIAL ACCESS โ
โ - Victim receives phishing link (email/SMS) โ
โ - Clicks link to fake Runx Banking page โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 2. FAKE LOGIN PAGE โ
โ - Displays convincing Runx branding โ
โ - Presents credential input form โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 3. CREDENTIAL CAPTURE โ
โ - Victim enters Banking credentials โ
โ - Form appears to process normally โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION โ
โ - Stolen credentials sent via WebSocket โ
โ - Single persistent connection used โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
```
Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:
```
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 1. INITIAL ACCESS โ
โ - Victim receives phishing link (email/SMS) โ
โ - Clicks link to fake Runx Banking page โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 2. FAKE LOGIN PAGE โ
โ - Displays convincing Runx branding โ
โ - Presents credential input form โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 3. CREDENTIAL CAPTURE โ
โ - Victim enters Banking credentials โ
โ - Form appears to process normally โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION โ
โ - Stolen credentials sent via WebSocket โ
โ - Single persistent connection used โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
```
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)