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Phishing Analysis

Detailed analysis of captured phishing page

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Visual Capture

Screenshot of salalatour.com

Detection Info

http://salalatour.com/plala.or.jp/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Detected Brand
Plala
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
f6bf71b2-cf1…
Analyzed
2026-04-01 10:18

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T140A1101813853B4F99A552A3D3752E9493E2941EC7320D48A85EE72F1C8814EEC7FAFC
CONTENT ssdeep
96:L3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNr2t5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDY7YoDSZHlf5D:c2kcRMgc0Qh

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
b29e9a3131dccc99
VISUAL aHash
dfe7bdc3c3ffefff
VISUAL dHash
394c68049e600800
VISUAL wHash
1c243c3cc0d0fcfc
VISUAL colorHash
07018000600
VISUAL cropResistant
394c68049e600800

Code Analysis

Risk Score 74/100
Threat Level ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 Banking

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

  • fromCharCode
  • hex_escape
  • base64_strings

📤 Form Action Targets

  • cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking
Credential Harvesting
Credential harvesting detected with 1 form(s) capturing sensitive data
Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 127 technique(s) to evade detection

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Banking Credential Harvester
Target
Plala users
Attack Method
credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
HTTP POST to backend
Risk Assessment
HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking
  • 127 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
Plala
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Token swap/DEX platform

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

Victim enters username and password into fake login form. Credentials are captured via JavaScript and exfiltrated to attacker's server in real-time.

Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation

Malicious code is obfuscated using 127 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

Domain Information

Domain
salalatour.com
Registered
2024-12-14 23:04:14+00:00
Registrar
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Status
Active (older domain)

Hosting Information

Provider
GoDaddy
ASN

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

Similar Websites

Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)

Screenshot
Plala
http://salalatour.com/updateplala.or.jp/jpn/webmai1/index.ph...
Apr 01, 2026
 Screenshot
Plala
http://marutitraders99.com/plalaa/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Mar 31, 2026
 Screenshot
Plala
http://marutitraders99.com/plalaa/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Mar 30, 2026
 Screenshot
Plala
http://nisha-interiors.com/plala.orr/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Mar 27, 2026
 Screenshot
Plala
https://mogahed.jo3.org//linkplala/jpn/webmai1/index.php
Mar 25, 2026

Scan History for salalatour.com

Found 8 other scans for this domain

😰
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