Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T1E0D2723460C5A9270887B2D1F7761B5BB7A09340D253870992FCCB5E2FD3C98DD2A5B4 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
384:HjkTddTPsutWl+N8E1Pqu3IgKMmw084N59Iy55ym/sRANb8wYTFo3iWJg:H/ur1PJ3IgKhR8m59v/VNbnYGc |
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
da34e9e9345a9469 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
0000060606fff9ff |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
92cc9cac9c233b23 |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
000006060fffffff |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
1b002000180 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
a080a07060c080a0,a28098da5a9080aa,808088fa3ab880b2,9200b8badaf80042,0411ea9292ca1582,9b00332b3b330323,921ecc8c9cacac98,317978b93c3c7a7e |
โข Threat: Crypto investment scam phishing
โข Target: Belgian citizens interested in crypto trading
โข Method: Deceptive website promises guaranteed daily profits through automated AI trading, collecting personal information through a signup form.
โข Exfil: Data sent to validation/thankyou.php (potentially custom API)
โข Indicators: New domain, unrealistic profit claims, form data exfiltration, and urgency tactics.
โข Risk: HIGH - Potential financial loss and identity theft.
The phishing kit is designed to harvest personal information (first name, last name, email) via a web form. Given the kit type (OTP Stealer), it likely intercepts one-time passwords (OTPs) sent to victims via SMS or email, enabling attackers to bypass 2FA protections on compromised accounts.
The campaign employs psychological manipulation by promising a daily benefit of โฌ975 and creating urgency with a limited number of spots (38 remaining). This tactic pressures victims into submitting their personal information without critical evaluation.
Contains obfuscated code likely used for form interception and credential harvesting.
Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:
```
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 1. INITIAL COMPROMISE โ
โ - Victim receives phishing link โ
โ - Redirects to fake Avertron AI Banking page โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 2. CREDENTIAL COLLECTION โ
โ - Victim enters login credentials โ
โ - Fake page captures input โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 3. OTP INTERCEPTION โ
โ - Fake page requests one-time password โ
โ - Victim enters OTP code โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION โ
โ - Collected credentials sent via HTTP POST โ
โ - Standard form submission to attacker server โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
```
Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:
```
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 1. INITIAL COMPROMISE โ
โ - Victim receives phishing link โ
โ - Redirects to fake Avertron AI Banking page โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 2. CREDENTIAL COLLECTION โ
โ - Victim enters login credentials โ
โ - Fake page captures input โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 3. OTP INTERCEPTION โ
โ - Fake page requests one-time password โ
โ - Victim enters OTP code โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโฌโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ
โผ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
โ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION โ
โ - Collected credentials sent via HTTP POST โ
โ - Standard form submission to attacker server โ
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
```
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)