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Phishing Analysis

Detailed analysis of captured phishing page

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Visual Capture

Screenshot of come.ac

Detection Info

https://come.ac/se-unsaorg
Detected Brand
Zimbra
Country
Unknown
Confidence
95%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
f8a9da09-ee6…
Analyzed
2026-06-04 05:54
Final URL (after redirects)
https://telasetelas.com.br/wp/logs/ssl/dz00/zm/z/imbra/se-unsa

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T16781C62180459D76858361C47961BF6813E983B4C303184DFCE98F8D1AD7EE5E2973DA
CONTENT ssdeep
96:kS4lpZdDt4eX3m0jcAmOUEs7whV4C6j0Lc9/z:KX3hjcaUdUhVB6uc9/z

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
b3a6cccc33333166
VISUAL aHash
ffffc3c3e7ffffe7
VISUAL dHash
204d4d4d4d32040c
VISUAL wHash
ffffe7c3e7000000
VISUAL colorHash
070000001c0
VISUAL cropResistant
204d4d4d4d32040c,c080a201a280a200,a089f4f464f0f00e

Code Analysis

Risk Score 53/100
Threat Level ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

  • document.write

🎯 Kit Endpoints

  • https://blog.zimbra.com
  • https://messagerie.se-unsa.org/css/common,login,zhtml,skin.css?skin=harmony&v=220324043827

📤 Form Action Targets

  • unsainc.php

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
70/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: Credential Harvester
Credential Harvesting
Credential harvesting detected with 1 form(s) capturing sensitive data
Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 1 technique(s) to evade detection

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Credential Harvesting Kit
Target
Zimbra users
Attack Method
credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
HTTP POST to backend
Risk Assessment
MEDIUM - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester
  • 1 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
Zimbra
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Credential harvesting service

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

Victim enters username and password into fake login form. Credentials are captured via JavaScript and exfiltrated to attacker's server in real-time.

Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation

Malicious code is obfuscated using 1 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

Domain Information

Domain
come.ac
Registered
2024-01-28 17:41:05+00:00
Registrar
Cloudflare, Inc
Status
Active (older domain)

Hosting Information

Provider
Cloudflare, Inc
ASN

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

Similar Websites

Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)

Screenshot
Zimbra
https://telasetelas.com.br/wp/logs/ssl/dz00/zm/z/imbra/se-un...
Jun 04, 2026

Scan History for come.ac

Found 10 other scans for this domain

😰
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