Phishing Analysis: plala

Captura Visual

Información de Detección

https://marutitraders99.com/plalaa/jpn/webmai1/index.php

Detected Brand

plala

Country

International

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

0198b9e1-da9…

Analyzed

2026-02-18 03:31

Hashes de Contenido (Similitud HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1B091F01813853B4F99A552A3D3752E9493E2541EC7324C58A85EE72F1C8814EEC7F9FC
CONTENT ssdeep	96:A3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNr2t5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDY7YoDSZHlf5D:j2kcRMgc0Qh

Hashes Visuales (Similitud de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b29e9a3131dccc99
VISUAL aHash	dfe7bdc3c3ffefff
VISUAL dHash	394c68049e600800
VISUAL wHash	1c243c3cc0d0fcfc
VISUAL colorHash	07018000600
VISUAL cropResistant	394c68049e600800

Análisis de Código

Risk Score 74/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 Banking

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Amenaza: Phishing de credenciales
• Objetivo: Usuarios de plala
• Método: Suplantación de identidad con un formulario de inicio de sesión.
• Exfil: cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php
• Indicadores: Dominio no coincide, formulario con campos de correo electrónico y contraseña, código ofuscado.
• Riesgo: Alto

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
hex_escape
base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

https://marutitraders99.com/plalaa/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/tags.js

📤 Form Action Targets

cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Desglose de Puntuación de Riesgo

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch

The domain does not belong to plala and is likely used for phishing.

Forms with credentials

The page includes forms asking for sensitive information like email and password.

Obfuscation Detected

Code obfuscation indicates attempts to hide malicious behavior, increasing the risk.

🔬 Análisis Integral de Amenazas

Tipo de Amenaza

Banking Credential Harvester

Objetivo

plala users (International)

Método de Ataque

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Canal de Exfiltración

HTTP POST to backend

Evaluación de Riesgo

HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking
124 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análisis de Suplantación de Marca

Impersonated Brand

plala

Fake Service

plala login

⚔️ Metodología de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker is using a fake login page to collect the victim's email address and password. The form submits the data to a malicious server.

Secondary Method: Social Engineering

The page is designed to look like the legitimate plala login page, attempting to trick users into entering their credentials.

🌐 Indicadores de Compromiso de Infraestructura

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

tags.js

File Size

Functions: td_4H.td_2e, td_4H.td_5g

📊 Diagrama de Flujo de Ataque

User fills <input name=username> → td_4H.td_2e() → fetch('https://marutitraders99.com/plalaa/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/tags.js') → credentials sent to remote server

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

99,1 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Moderate
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

User fills <input name=username> → td_4H.td_2e() → fetch('https://marutitraders99.com/plalaa/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/tags.js') → credentials sent to remote server