SafeMode - Analysis: tactica7.com.mx

Captura Visual

Información de Detección

https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/index.php

Detected Brand

Plala

Country

International

Confianza

95%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

09a2837a-033…

Analyzed

2026-02-09 12:25

Hashes de Contenido (Similitud HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1AD91EF1822853B4F999852A3C3752E94D3E1941EC7724D58A81EE72F1C8814EEC7F9FC
CONTENT ssdeep	96:A3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNr2t5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDY7YoDSZQ:j2kcRMgc0v

Hashes Visuales (Similitud de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b29e9a3131dccc99
VISUAL aHash	dfe7bdc3c3ffefff
VISUAL dHash	394c68049e600800
VISUAL wHash	1c243c3cc0d0fcfc
VISUAL colorHash	07018000600
VISUAL cropResistant	394c68049e600800

Análisis de Código

Risk Score 59/100

Nivel de Amenaza ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Amenaza: Phishing
• Objetivo: Usuarios de Plala
• Método: Impersonación de la página de inicio de sesión.
• Exfil: cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php
• Indicadores: Discordancia de dominio, javascript ofuscado, acción de formulario a un script PHP sospechoso
• Riesgo: Alto

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
hex_escape
base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

http://www.plala.or.jp/
https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/common.js
https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/tags.js

📤 Form Action Targets

cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Desglose de Puntuación de Riesgo

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch

The domain does not belong to Plala.

Javascript Obfuscation

Javascript code obfuscation indicates an attempt to hide malicious code.

Form Submission to suspicious URL

Form action is targeting to a suspicious PHP script that will likely steal credentials.

🔬 Análisis Integral de Amenazas

Tipo de Amenaza

Credential Harvesting Kit

Objetivo

Plala users (International)

Método de Ataque

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Canal de Exfiltración

HTTP POST to backend

Evaluación de Riesgo

MEDIUM - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester
54 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análisis de Suplantación de Marca

Impersonated Brand

Plala

Official Website

plala.jp

Fake Service

Login

⚔️ Metodología de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker is attempting to steal user credentials by mimicking the Plala login page and redirecting the submitted information to a malicious server.

Secondary Method: Javascript Obfuscation

The javascript code on the page is obfuscated in an attempt to hide the malicious logic.

🌐 Indicadores de Compromiso de Infraestructura

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

common.js

File Size

Functions: tmx_post_session_params_fixed(), tmx_run_page_fingerprinting(), td_1B() - form data collection, td_5o() - iframe content access, td_3j() - initialization trigger

📊 Diagrama de Flujo de Ataque

1. Step 1: Script loads and initializes fingerprinting components (td_3j)
2. Step 2: Collects browser/OS fingerprint via tmx_run_page_fingerprinting()
3. Step 3: Monitors form submissions and session data via td_1B()
4. Step 4: Encodes collected data using XOR obfuscation (td_5I)
5. Step 5: Creates hidden iframe for exfiltration (td_5o)
6. Step 6: Sends data via tmx_post_session_params_fixed() to attacker server
7. Step 7: Uses CSP nonce bypass to inject additional malicious scripts

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

99,1 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Moderate
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: Script loads and initializes fingerprinting components (td_3j)
2. Step 2: Collects browser/OS fingerprint via tmx_run_page_fingerprinting()
3. Step 3: Monitors form submissions and session data via td_1B()
4. Step 4: Encodes collected data using XOR obfuscation (td_5I)
5. Step 5: Creates hidden iframe for exfiltration (td_5o)
6. Step 6: Sends data via tmx_post_session_params_fixed() to attacker server
7. Step 7: Uses CSP nonce bypass to inject additional malicious scripts