Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T18B417BB28045DB639283A1E0DB76271BB3C1C645CE5B0B0166F893EE5FDBD94CD1B012 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
24:2OSNEKUcDPiQ+NB8EYCQp26BS9Fp26BS0d/p26BNLu5h9y6Tt/11Zixm:dSVhDKNrFQLBuFLBTRLBdu/86T/1Um |
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
e3ce1893639964ce |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
e7e7e7e7e3c3c7c3 |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
0e0e0c0e0e9e9e96 |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
c3c3c3c3c3c3c3c3 |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
07018000200 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
0e0e0c0e0e9e9e96,2d242034bececfcf |
• Amenaza: Phishing de suplantación de marca
• Objetivo: Usuarios de bet365
• Método: Página de registro falsa que imita la marca bet365
• Exfil: Posible exfiltración de datos a través de JavaScript ofuscado
• Indicadores: Dominio no coincidente, registro de dominio reciente, TLD no relacionado
• Riesgo: ALTO - Posibilidad de robo de credenciales y fraude financiero
The phishing kit employs a credential harvester to capture usernames, passwords, and other sensitive account details entered by victims. Data is likely exfiltrated in real-time to an attacker-controlled server for immediate use in account takeover or financial fraud.
The OTP Stealer kit intercepts one-time passwords (OTPs) or two-factor authentication (2FA) codes, enabling attackers to bypass additional security layers and gain unauthorized access to victim accounts.
Highly obfuscated JavaScript file likely containing credential harvesting and OTP interception logic.
Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. VICTIM RECEIVES PHISHING LURE │
│ - Fake bet365 email/link directs to malicious site │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. FAKE LOGIN PAGE DISPLAYED │
│ - Victim sees cloned bet365 login interface │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. CREDENTIALS ENTERED │
│ - Victim inputs Banking credentials │
│ - Form appears identical to legitimate site │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA COLLECTION │
│ - Credentials captured by attacker's server │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 5. EXFILTRATION VIA HTTP POST │
│ - Stolen credentials sent via standard form submission│
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. VICTIM RECEIVES PHISHING LURE │
│ - Fake bet365 email/link directs to malicious site │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. FAKE LOGIN PAGE DISPLAYED │
│ - Victim sees cloned bet365 login interface │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. CREDENTIALS ENTERED │
│ - Victim inputs Banking credentials │
│ - Form appears identical to legitimate site │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA COLLECTION │
│ - Credentials captured by attacker's server │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 5. EXFILTRATION VIA HTTP POST │
│ - Stolen credentials sent via standard form submission│
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)