SafeMode - Analysis: aik.chase998.uk.cc

Captura Visual

Información de Detección

http://aik.chase998.uk.cc

Detected Brand

Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, Gmarket, 11ST, Olive Young, Lotte ON

Country

South Korea

Confianza

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

87a37f1a-79b…

Analyzed

2026-01-26 09:44

Final URL (after redirects)

http://aik.chase998.uk.cc/index/index/home.html

Hashes de Contenido (Similitud HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1D6921A29B54E5C62DF33C4C2A4E02D273499E3078A2A09E15BD905B59FD3CF0B989FB4
CONTENT ssdeep	96:YiryG1T0aP6kpxhHQEsW3wSUPVRUGrkE5K8VzQ/96DeLa1k+fyc2Cm/zSWtILOPo:Yi7TpAExrakOUz+yoVX/0/6

Hashes Visuales (Similitud de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	dcdd73f1e6260809
VISUAL aHash	e7fc181818180000
VISUAL dHash	0f32b3333332440e
VISUAL wHash	ffff3c3c3c3c0000
VISUAL colorHash	39600008200
VISUAL cropResistant	06066669c30f0684,0008bc98b9b7bc9d,0f00000000000008,a6a294554d3931c2,0f32b3333332440e

Análisis de Código

Risk Score 68/100

Nivel de Amenaza ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Amenaza: Estafa de comisiones de comercio electrónico
• Objetivo: Usuarios en Corea del Sur, con marcas de comercio electrónico coreanas
• Método: Estafa que ofrece comisiones por procesar pedidos después de un depósito inicial
• Exfil: Desconocido, pero probablemente recopilación de información personal/financiera
• Indicators: Afirmaciones de comisiones engañosas, dominio desconocido, depósito requerido
• Riesgo: ALTO - Riesgo de pérdida financiera, robo de datos personales

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode

📊 Desglose de Puntuación de Riesgo

Total Risk Score

100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit

Detected Credential Harvester and OTP Stealer kits with real-time form interception capabilities.

Brand Impersonation

Impersonates multiple high-profile e-commerce brands (Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, Gmarket, 11ST, Olive Young, Lotte ON) to deceive victims.

Obfuscation Techniques

Detected 2 obfuscation techniques in JavaScript files, complicating analysis and detection evasion.

Suspicious Claims

Promises commissions for processing orders and requires a minimum deposit of 100,000 KRW, indicating financial fraud.

Malicious JavaScript

Inclusion of JavaScript file (swiper-bundle.min.js) with potential obfuscation, totaling 0.14 MB in size.

🔬 Análisis Integral de Amenazas

Tipo de Amenaza

Two-Factor Authentication Stealer

Objetivo

Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, Gmarket, 11ST, Olive Young, Lotte ON users (South Korea)

Método de Ataque

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Canal de Exfiltración

Unknown

Evaluación de Riesgo

HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with Unknown

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer
2 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análisis de Suplantación de Marca

Impersonated Brand

Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, Gmarket, 11ST, Olive Young, Lotte ON

Official Website

https://www.coupang.com, https://www.ssg.com, https://www.aliexpress.com, https://www.gmarket.co.kr, https://www.11st.co.kr, https://www.oliveyoung.co.kr, https://www.lotteon.com

Fake Service

Commission-based order processing

Fraudulent Claims

⚔️ Metodología de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The phishing kit captures user credentials through fake login forms mimicking e-commerce platforms. Submitted data is likely exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server for account takeover or financial fraud.

Secondary Method: OTP Stealer

The kit includes functionality to intercept one-time passwords (OTPs) sent to victims, enabling attackers to bypass two-factor authentication and gain unauthorized access to accounts.

🌐 Indicadores de Compromiso de Infraestructura

Domain Information

Dominio

aik.chase998.uk.cc

Registered

1997-10-13 04:00:00+00:00

Registrar

Gname.com Pte. Ltd.

Estado

Active (10332 days old)

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

File Size

JavaScript file with potential obfuscation, associated with the phishing kit.

📊 Diagrama de Flujo de Ataque

Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. TARGET RECEIVES PHISHING LURE                          │
│    - Fake email/SMS with malicious link                  │
│    - Mimics Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, etc. branding     │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. VICTIM LANDS ON FAKE SITE                             │
│    - Clone of legitimate e-commerce login page           │
│    - Requests user credentials                           │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. CREDENTIAL INPUT                                      │
│    - User enters username/password                       │
│    - Form appears identical to real site                 │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION                                     │
│    - Credentials sent via HTTP POST                      │
│    - Standard form submission to attacker server         │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

139,7 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Light

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. TARGET RECEIVES PHISHING LURE                          │
│    - Fake email/SMS with malicious link                  │
│    - Mimics Coupang, SSG, AliExpress, etc. branding     │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. VICTIM LANDS ON FAKE SITE                             │
│    - Clone of legitimate e-commerce login page           │
│    - Requests user credentials                           │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. CREDENTIAL INPUT                                      │
│    - User enters username/password                       │
│    - Form appears identical to real site                 │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION                                     │
│    - Credentials sent via HTTP POST                      │
│    - Standard form submission to attacker server         │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```