Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T136F1D8D3E048540A1312C9C1AED7E244F2368717CB56653ADAB650E3F3D9AF4C27A7A2 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
192:Lp3lBluhF1vyYDYV9Hsqu9jZP1N8dPVIq:Lp3lBludyYOdsqojZPv8dtr |
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
834973670ce7cc66 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
00001e3f01ffffff |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
e2d2f4ecebcecece |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
0000180f03ffffff |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
03003000180 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
f8eceeebcececeea,c072c2d4ececeeeb |
• Amenaza: Phishing de robo de credenciales de DANA
• Objetivo: Usuarios de la billetera electrónica DANA en Indonesia
• Método: Sitio web falso para robar las credenciales de usuario.
• Exfil: Desconocido.
• Indicators: Dominio sospechoso, Javascript ofuscado y formularios para la captura de credenciales.
• Riesgo: ALTO - Robo inmediato de credenciales.
The phishing kit employs multiple forms to capture user credentials, such as login details, PINs, or other sensitive financial information. The harvested data is likely transmitted to an attacker-controlled server for immediate exploitation or resale on underground markets.
The campaign mimics DANA's official branding and service offerings, such as DANA Paylater and DANA Cicil, to trick users into believing the site is legitimate and prompting them to enter their credentials.
JavaScript file included in the phishing kit, potentially used for UI manipulation or data exfiltration.
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)