SafeMode - Analysis: kanodiadecor.com

Captura Visual

Información de Detección

https://kanodiadecor.com/mpp/Sites/index.html

Detected Brand

plala

Country

Unknown

Confianza

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

baf52c45-a7a…

Analyzed

2026-01-27 11:41

Hashes de Contenido (Similitud HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T10BA1121C12853B4F999952A2D3752E94D3E1941EC7324C58A85EE72F1C8814EEC7F9FC
CONTENT ssdeep	96:A3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNrft5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDv72oDSZHlfd5D:j2bcRM3a0QD

Hashes Visuales (Similitud de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b2969b3131dccc99
VISUAL aHash	dfe7bdc3c3ffefff
VISUAL dHash	394c68049e600800
VISUAL wHash	1f273f3f03130303
VISUAL colorHash	07018000600
VISUAL cropResistant	394c68049e600800

Análisis de Código

Risk Score 77/100

Nivel de Amenaza ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 Banking

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
document.write
hex_escape
base64_strings

📤 Form Action Targets

cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Desglose de Puntuación de Riesgo

Total Risk Score

100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit

Detected Credential Harvester and Banking phishing kits targeting plala users.

High Obfuscation

90 obfuscation techniques detected, indicating evasion of static analysis.

Malicious JavaScript

Presence of common.js file with obfuscated code, likely containing credential harvesting logic.

Brand Impersonation

Impersonation of plala, a known service provider, increasing likelihood of victim trust.

🔬 Análisis Integral de Amenazas

Tipo de Amenaza

Banking Credential Harvester

Objetivo

plala users

Método de Ataque

credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Canal de Exfiltración

HTTP POST to backend

Evaluación de Riesgo

HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking
90 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análisis de Suplantación de Marca

Impersonated Brand

plala

Official Website

https://www.plala.or.jp/

Fake Service

Fake plala account login portal

⚔️ Metodología de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The phishing kit captures user credentials via a fake login form mimicking plala's authentication portal. Submitted data is likely exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server in real-time.

Secondary Method: Banking Trojan Deployment

Post-credential theft, the kit may deploy additional scripts to intercept Banking sessions or prompt users for financial details under false pretenses.

🌐 Indicadores de Compromiso de Infraestructura

Domain Information

Dominio

kanodiadecor.com

Registered

2021-10-20 14:52:05+00:00

Registrar

PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com

Estado

Active (1559 days old)

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

File Size

Obfuscated JavaScript file likely containing credential harvesting logic.

📊 Diagrama de Flujo de Ataque

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. ATTACKER DEPLOYS FAKE PLALA SITE                      │
│    - Mimics legitimate Banking portal                    │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. VICTIM RECEIVES PHISHING LURE                         │
│    - Email/SMS with fake login link                      │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. VICTIM ENTERS CREDENTIALS                             │
│    - Submits login details to fake form                  │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. CREDENTIALS EXFILTRATED                               │
│    - Data sent via HTTP POST to attacker-controlled      │
│      server                                              │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

2,3 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. ATTACKER DEPLOYS FAKE PLALA SITE                      │
│    - Mimics legitimate Banking portal                    │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. VICTIM RECEIVES PHISHING LURE                         │
│    - Email/SMS with fake login link                      │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. VICTIM ENTERS CREDENTIALS                             │
│    - Submits login details to fake form                  │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. CREDENTIALS EXFILTRATED                               │
│    - Data sent via HTTP POST to attacker-controlled      │
│      server                                              │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘