SafeMode - Analysis: tactica7.com.mx

Captura Visual

Informações de Detecção

https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/index.php

Detected Brand

Plala

Country

International

Confiança

95%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

09a2837a-033…

Analyzed

2026-02-09 12:25

Hashes de Conteúdo (Similaridade HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1AD91EF1822853B4F999852A3C3752E94D3E1941EC7724D58A81EE72F1C8814EEC7F9FC
CONTENT ssdeep	96:A3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNr2t5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDY7YoDSZQ:j2kcRMgc0v

Hashes Visuais (Similaridade de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b29e9a3131dccc99
VISUAL aHash	dfe7bdc3c3ffefff
VISUAL dHash	394c68049e600800
VISUAL wHash	1c243c3cc0d0fcfc
VISUAL colorHash	07018000600
VISUAL cropResistant	394c68049e600800

Análise de Código

Risk Score 59/100

Nível de Ameaça ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Ameaça: Phishing
• Alvo: Usuários do Plala
• Método: Imitação da página de login.
• Exfil: cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php
• Indicadores: Incompatibilidade de domínio, javascript ofuscado, ação de formulário para script PHP suspeito
• Risco: Alto

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
hex_escape
base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

http://www.plala.or.jp/
https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/common.js
https://tactica7.com.mx/js/jpn/webmai1/sso/pf/js/tags.js

📤 Form Action Targets

cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Detalhamento da Pontuação de Risco

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch

The domain does not belong to Plala.

Javascript Obfuscation

Javascript code obfuscation indicates an attempt to hide malicious code.

Form Submission to suspicious URL

Form action is targeting to a suspicious PHP script that will likely steal credentials.

🔬 Análise Integral de Ameaças

Tipo de Ameaça

Credential Harvesting Kit

Alvo

Plala users (International)

Método de Ataque

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Canal de Exfiltração

HTTP POST to backend

Avaliação de Risco

MEDIUM - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester
54 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análise de Falsificação de Marca

Impersonated Brand

Plala

Official Website

plala.jp

Fake Service

Login

⚔️ Metodologia de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker is attempting to steal user credentials by mimicking the Plala login page and redirecting the submitted information to a malicious server.

Secondary Method: Javascript Obfuscation

The javascript code on the page is obfuscated in an attempt to hide the malicious logic.

🌐 Indicadores de Compromisso de Infraestrutura

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

common.js

File Size

Functions: tmx_post_session_params_fixed(), tmx_run_page_fingerprinting(), td_1B() - form data collection, td_5o() - iframe content access, td_3j() - initialization trigger

📊 Diagrama de Fluxo de Ataque

1. Step 1: Script loads and initializes fingerprinting components (td_3j)
2. Step 2: Collects browser/OS fingerprint via tmx_run_page_fingerprinting()
3. Step 3: Monitors form submissions and session data via td_1B()
4. Step 4: Encodes collected data using XOR obfuscation (td_5I)
5. Step 5: Creates hidden iframe for exfiltration (td_5o)
6. Step 6: Sends data via tmx_post_session_params_fixed() to attacker server
7. Step 7: Uses CSP nonce bypass to inject additional malicious scripts

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

99,1 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Moderate
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: Script loads and initializes fingerprinting components (td_3j)
2. Step 2: Collects browser/OS fingerprint via tmx_run_page_fingerprinting()
3. Step 3: Monitors form submissions and session data via td_1B()
4. Step 4: Encodes collected data using XOR obfuscation (td_5I)
5. Step 5: Creates hidden iframe for exfiltration (td_5o)
6. Step 6: Sends data via tmx_post_session_params_fixed() to attacker server
7. Step 7: Uses CSP nonce bypass to inject additional malicious scripts