Phishing Analysis: plala

Captura Visual

Informações de Detecção

https://salalatour.com/plala.or.jp/jpn/webmai1/index.php

Detected Brand

plala

Country

International

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

8f499838-f45…

Analyzed

2026-03-19 10:35

Hashes de Conteúdo (Similaridade HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T13FA1101813853B4F99A552A3D3752E9493E2941EC7324D48A85EE72F1C8814EEC7FAFC
CONTENT ssdeep	96:L3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNr2t5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDY7YoDSZHlfd5D:c2kcRMgc0QD

Hashes Visuais (Similaridade de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b29e9a3131dccc99
VISUAL aHash	dfe7bdc3c3ffefff
VISUAL dHash	394c68049e600800
VISUAL wHash	1c243c3cc0d0fcfc
VISUAL colorHash	07018000600
VISUAL cropResistant	394c68049e600800

Análise de Código

Risk Score 74/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 Banking

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Ameaça: Phishing de credenciais
• Alvo: Usuários do plala
• Método: Impersonação via formulário de login
• Exfil: cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php
• Indicadores: Ofuscação, Ações de formulário, Incompatibilidade de domínio
• Risco: ALTO

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
hex_escape
base64_strings

📤 Form Action Targets

cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Detalhamento da Pontuação de Risco

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch

The domain salalatour.com does not belong to plala

Form Action Suspicious

Form actions on the page point to suspicious file.

Obfuscation Detected

The page's Javascript is obfuscated, a typical tactic used by phishing sites.

Impersonation

The page is trying to look like the real plala login page.

🔬 Análise Integral de Ameaças

Tipo de Ameaça

Banking Credential Harvester

Alvo

plala users (International)

Método de Ataque

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Canal de Exfiltração

HTTP POST to backend

Avaliação de Risco

HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking
125 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análise de Falsificação de Marca

Impersonated Brand

plala

Fake Service

plala login

⚔️ Metodologia de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

This phishing attack aims to steal plala login credentials by presenting a fake login form that mimics the appearance of the legitimate plala website.