EN ES PT
Back to Stats

Captura Visual

Screenshot of kanodiadecor.com

Informações de Detecção

https://kanodiadecor.com/mpp/Sites/index.html
Detected Brand
plala
Country
Unknown
Confidence
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
baf52c45-a7a…
Analyzed
2026-01-27 11:41

Hashes de Conteúdo (Similaridade HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T10BA1121C12853B4F999952A2D3752E94D3E1941EC7324C58A85EE72F1C8814EEC7F9FC
CONTENT ssdeep
96:A3ydpoIL/N+lglAtyHL5ZiNrft5CLJWfsT3yDSxyHJHAPboRbDv72oDSZHlfd5D:j2bcRM3a0QD

Hashes Visuais (Similaridade de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
b2969b3131dccc99
VISUAL aHash
dfe7bdc3c3ffefff
VISUAL dHash
394c68049e600800
VISUAL wHash
1f273f3f03130303
VISUAL colorHash
07018000600
VISUAL cropResistant
394c68049e600800

Análise de Código

Risk Score 77/100
Threat Level ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 Banking

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

  • fromCharCode
  • document.write
  • hex_escape
  • base64_strings

📤 Form Action Targets

  • cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Detalhamento da Pontuação de Risco

Total Risk Score
100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit
Detected Credential Harvester and Banking phishing kits targeting plala users.
High Obfuscation
90 obfuscation techniques detected, indicating evasion of static analysis.
Malicious JavaScript
Presence of common.js file with obfuscated code, likely containing credential harvesting logic.
Brand Impersonation
Impersonation of plala, a known service provider, increasing likelihood of victim trust.

🔬 Análise Integral de Ameaças

Tipo de Ameaça
Banking Credential Harvester
Alvo
plala users
Método de Ataque
credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Canal de Exfiltração
HTTP POST to backend
Avaliação de Risco
HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking
  • 90 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análise de Falsificação de Marca

Impersonated Brand
plala
Official Website
https://www.plala.or.jp/
Fake Service
Fake plala account login portal

⚔️ Metodologia de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The phishing kit captures user credentials via a fake login form mimicking plala's authentication portal. Submitted data is likely exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server in real-time.

Secondary Method: Banking Trojan Deployment

Post-credential theft, the kit may deploy additional scripts to intercept Banking sessions or prompt users for financial details under false pretenses.

🌐 Indicadores de Compromisso de Infraestrutura

Domain Information

Domain
kanodiadecor.com
Registered
2021-10-20 14:52:05+00:00
Registrar
PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com
Status
Active (1559 days old)

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File
File Size

Obfuscated JavaScript file likely containing credential harvesting logic.

📊 Diagrama de Fluxo de Ataque

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. ATTACKER DEPLOYS FAKE PLALA SITE                      │
│    - Mimics legitimate Banking portal                    │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. VICTIM RECEIVES PHISHING LURE                         │
│    - Email/SMS with fake login link                      │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. VICTIM ENTERS CREDENTIALS                             │
│    - Submits login details to fake form                  │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. CREDENTIALS EXFILTRATED                               │
│    - Data sent via HTTP POST to attacker-controlled      │
│      server                                              │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size
2,3 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other
1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

  • : None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. ATTACKER DEPLOYS FAKE PLALA SITE                      │
│    - Mimics legitimate Banking portal                    │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. VICTIM RECEIVES PHISHING LURE                         │
│    - Email/SMS with fake login link                      │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. VICTIM ENTERS CREDENTIALS                             │
│    - Submits login details to fake form                  │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. CREDENTIALS EXFILTRATED                               │
│    - Data sent via HTTP POST to attacker-controlled      │
│      server                                              │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

🎯 Malicious Files Identified

😰
"Nunca pensei que aconteceria comigo"
Isso dizem os 2,3 milhões de vítimas a cada ano. Não espere para ser uma estatística.