Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T160D2A431E109783F16ABB3D0E772B35A639686C9E943131A42FD874D0BDFD90EE06496 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
384:7bNHIIK+9mIIIII9XmaKUCuBTSii8F3yw7JxgeOFIULq4UuOpW:hII2IIIIIJVBtyw7JY6ml |
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
c3e35c1c1971c69e |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
00e3e7ef3f3c1818 |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
97c7cfdbf1e1f0f0 |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
00e3e7ef3f781818 |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
31030000000 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
f3e3d3ce9c988c0c,0000606161600000,97c7cfdbf1e1f0f0 |
Victim is prompted for 2FA code after entering credentials. The code is intercepted and used by attacker to access victim's account in real-time.
JavaScript intercepts form submissions before they reach the fake backend. This allows real-time credential harvesting and validation without server round-trips.
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)