Detailed analysis of captured phishing page
Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
CONTENT
TLSH
|
T1E0D2723460C5A9270887B2D1F7761B5BB7A09340D253870992FCCB5E2FD3C98DD2A5B4 |
|
CONTENT
ssdeep
|
384:HjkTddTPsutWl+N8E1Pqu3IgKMmw084N59Iy55ym/sRANb8wYTFo3iWJg:H/ur1PJ3IgKhR8m59v/VNbnYGc |
Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots
| Algorithm | Hash Value |
|---|---|
|
VISUAL
pHash
|
da34e9e9345a9469 |
|
VISUAL
aHash
|
0000060606fff9ff |
|
VISUAL
dHash
|
92cc9cac9c233b23 |
|
VISUAL
wHash
|
000006060fffffff |
|
VISUAL
colorHash
|
1b002000180 |
|
VISUAL
cropResistant
|
a080a07060c080a0,a28098da5a9080aa,808088fa3ab880b2,9200b8badaf80042,0411ea9292ca1582,9b00332b3b330323,921ecc8c9cacac98,317978b93c3c7a7e |
• Ameaça: Phishing de golpe de investimento em criptomoedas
• Alvo: Cidadãos belgas interessados em negociação de criptomoedas
• Método: Um site enganoso promete lucros diários garantidos através de negociação automatizada de IA, coletando informações pessoais através de um formulário de inscrição.
• Exfil: Dados enviados para validation/thankyou.php (potencialmente API personalizada)
• Indicadores: Domínio novo, alegações de lucro irrealistas, exfiltração de dados de formulário e táticas de urgência.
• Risco: ALTO - Potencial perda financeira e roubo de identidade.
The phishing kit is designed to harvest personal information (first name, last name, email) via a web form. Given the kit type (OTP Stealer), it likely intercepts one-time passwords (OTPs) sent to victims via SMS or email, enabling attackers to bypass 2FA protections on compromised accounts.
The campaign employs psychological manipulation by promising a daily benefit of €975 and creating urgency with a limited number of spots (38 remaining). This tactic pressures victims into submitting their personal information without critical evaluation.
Contains obfuscated code likely used for form interception and credential harvesting.
Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. INITIAL COMPROMISE │
│ - Victim receives phishing link │
│ - Redirects to fake Avertron AI Banking page │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. CREDENTIAL COLLECTION │
│ - Victim enters login credentials │
│ - Fake page captures input │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. OTP INTERCEPTION │
│ - Fake page requests one-time password │
│ - Victim enters OTP code │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION │
│ - Collected credentials sent via HTTP POST │
│ - Standard form submission to attacker server │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
Here's a generic ASCII art attack flow diagram for the phishing attack:
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. INITIAL COMPROMISE │
│ - Victim receives phishing link │
│ - Redirects to fake Avertron AI Banking page │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. CREDENTIAL COLLECTION │
│ - Victim enters login credentials │
│ - Fake page captures input │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. OTP INTERCEPTION │
│ - Fake page requests one-time password │
│ - Victim enters OTP code │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA EXFILTRATION │
│ - Collected credentials sent via HTTP POST │
│ - Standard form submission to attacker server │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)