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Phishing Analysis

Detailed analysis of captured phishing page

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Captura Visual

Screenshot of secure.dhlguestmanagement.com

Informações de Detecção

http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/login.cfm?ref=/events2/index.cfm?auuid=420108F3-DCB0-B861-0DE000110CB3961Acredapp.cfm&statusCodeID=10
Detected Brand
DHL
Country
Unknown
Confiança
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
fc73c905-821…
Analyzed
2026-02-09 23:55
Final URL (after redirects)
https://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/login.cfm?ref=/events2/index.cfm?auuid=420108F3-DCB0-B861-0DE000110CB3961Acredapp.cfm&statusCodeID=10

Hashes de Conteúdo (Similaridade HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T13B147614FB0207C484F9BCD5949772E4A041CE2FA34A6597252F53F67CCACA63EA239D
CONTENT ssdeep
384:DHgJWIVlJTy4yLMiVH8z2IVvg/py2pLaQlmXBwJlVIXv4kcYbUo0Wo3mNKX:sJ/wS2AqpL0wTVIXv4+Uo0Wo3mN2

Hashes Visuais (Similaridade de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
b8396c3c316ccec5
VISUAL aHash
81c3ffcfcf9fc3c3
VISUAL dHash
3b1b001c1c2a3737
VISUAL wHash
8181dfcfc79f8181
VISUAL colorHash
06400030000
VISUAL cropResistant
3b1b001c1c2a3737

Análise de Código

Risk Score 85/100
Nível de Ameaça ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer 🎣 Card Stealer 🎣 Banking 🎣 Personal Info

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

  • atob
  • eval
  • fromCharCode
  • unescape
  • base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

  • http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/js/rem.1.3.4.min.js
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
  • https://)
  • http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/js/selectivizr.1.0.2.min.js
  • http://stackoverflow.com/a/32954565/96342
  • http://blog.jquery.com/2012/08/09/jquery-1-8-released/
  • http://iptc.org/std/Iptc4xmpExt/2008-02-29/
  • http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/foundation-5.5.2/js/foundation.min.js
  • http://heydonworks.com/practical_aria_examples/js/a11y.js
  • http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/eventdata/9747/js/Canlendar/fullcalendar.js?ev=32
  • http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/CFJS/ajax/package/cfajax.js
  • https://),url(https://),red
  • http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/CFJS/ajax/messages/cfmessage.js
  • http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
  • http://www.gettyimages.com/xsltExtension/1.0
  • http://jqueryui.com/demos/position/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
  • http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lti/2008/04/23/a-regular-expression-to-match-any-url/
  • http://schemas.android.com/apk/lib/com.google.android.gms.plus
  • https://jqueryui.com
  • http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/js/respond.1.4.2.min.js
  • http://jquery.org/license
  • https://learn.jquery.com/using-jquery-core/faq/how-do-i-select-an-element-by-an-id-that-has-characters-used-in-css-notation/)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
  • http://fgelinas.com/code/timepicker
  • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
  • https://fullcalendar.io/
  • http://underscorejs.org
  • http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/states-of-the-type-attribute.html#valid-e-mail-address
  • /events2/login.cfm?&ref=%2Fevents2%2Findex%2Ecfm%3Fauuid%3D420108F3%2DDCB0%2DB861%2D0DE000110CB3961Acredapp%2Ecfm&statuscodeid=10

📡 API Calls Detected

  • get
  • GET

📤 Form Action Targets

  • /events2/login.cfm?&ref=%2Fevents2%2Findex%2Ecfm%3Fauuid%3D420108F3%2DDCB0%2DB861%2D0DE000110CB3961Acredapp%2Ecfm&statuscodeid=10

📊 Detalhamento da Pontuação de Risco

Total Risk Score
100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit
Detected kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
Credential Harvesting
Credential harvesting detected with 5 form(s) capturing sensitive data
Code Obfuscation
JavaScript code obfuscated using 46 technique(s) to evade detection

🔬 Análise Integral de Ameaças

Tipo de Ameaça
Banking Credential Harvester
Alvo
DHL users
Método de Ataque
credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Canal de Exfiltração
HTTP POST to backend
Avaliação de Risco
CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
  • 46 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análise de Falsificação de Marca

Impersonated Brand
DHL
Official Website
N/A
Fake Service
Token swap/DEX platform

⚔️ Metodologia de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

Victim enters username and password into fake login form. Credentials are captured via JavaScript and exfiltrated to attacker's server in real-time.

Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation

Malicious code is obfuscated using 46 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.

🌐 Indicadores de Compromisso de Infraestrutura

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File
webpackBundle_frontend.js?v=2.1.597
File Size

Functions: SSSI.frontend.validatePW() - Validates password complexity against backend rules, SSSI.frontend.svalidatePasswords() - Compares password fields for consistency, SSSI.frontend.sendVerificationCode() - Sends MFA verification codes to user-provided phone numbers, SSSI.frontend.loginResendVerificationCode() - Resends MFA codes to capture updated credentials, SSSI.frontend.verifyMFA() - Submits MFA verification codes to the backend, jQuery.ajax() - Used extensively to send captured credentials and MFA codes to the attacker's server, SSSI.frontend.togglePassword() - Toggles password visibility to enhance user experience and trust, SSSI.util.updateModalButtons() - Manipulates modal dialogs to guide users through the phishing flow

📊 Diagrama de Fluxo de Ataque

1. Step 1: User lands on the spoofed DHL guest management portal ('secure.dhlguestmanagement.com')
2. Step 2: User enters login credentials (username/email and password) into the dynamically generated form
3. Step 3: Password complexity is validated client-side via SSSI.frontend.validatePW(), which sends the password to the backend for validation (AJAX POST to ControllerProxy.cfc)
4. Step 4: If MFA is enabled, the user is prompted to enter a phone number for verification code delivery
5. Step 5: SSSI.frontend.sendVerificationCode() sends the phone number to the backend, triggering an SMS with a verification code
6. Step 6: User enters the MFA code, which is captured and sent to the backend via SSSI.frontend.verifyMFA()
7. Step 7: If the user requests a resend of the MFA code, SSSI.frontend.loginResendVerificationCode() captures the updated phone number or MFA channel (SMS/WhatsApp)
8. Step 8: All captured data (credentials, phone numbers, MFA codes) is exfiltrated via AJAX POST requests to the attacker's ColdFusion backend
9. Step 9: The backend processes the data, likely storing it for later use or forwarding it to the attacker via email, Telegram, or another exfiltration channel

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language
English (1%)
Total Code Size
1,5 MB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other
29

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

  • : None
  • : Light
  • : Light
  • : None
  • : Light
  • : None
  • : Moderate
  • : Light
  • : Light
  • : Light
  • : None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: User lands on the spoofed DHL guest management portal ('secure.dhlguestmanagement.com')
2. Step 2: User enters login credentials (username/email and password) into the dynamically generated form
3. Step 3: Password complexity is validated client-side via SSSI.frontend.validatePW(), which sends the password to the backend for validation (AJAX POST to ControllerProxy.cfc)
4. Step 4: If MFA is enabled, the user is prompted to enter a phone number for verification code delivery
5. Step 5: SSSI.frontend.sendVerificationCode() sends the phone number to the backend, triggering an SMS with a verification code
6. Step 6: User enters the MFA code, which is captured and sent to the backend via SSSI.frontend.verifyMFA()
7. Step 7: If the user requests a resend of the MFA code, SSSI.frontend.loginResendVerificationCode() captures the updated phone number or MFA channel (SMS/WhatsApp)
8. Step 8: All captured data (credentials, phone numbers, MFA codes) is exfiltrated via AJAX POST requests to the attacker's ColdFusion backend
9. Step 9: The backend processes the data, likely storing it for later use or forwarding it to the attacker via email, Telegram, or another exfiltration channel

🎯 Malicious Files Identified

Main Drainer
webpackBundle_frontend.js?v=2.1.597
File Size
603KB
Malicious Functions
  • SSSI.frontend.validatePW() - Validates password complexity against backend rules
  • SSSI.frontend.svalidatePasswords() - Compares password fields for consistency
  • SSSI.frontend.sendVerificationCode() - Sends MFA verification codes to user-provided phone numbers
  • SSSI.frontend.loginResendVerificationCode() - Resends MFA codes to capture updated credentials
  • SSSI.frontend.verifyMFA() - Submits MFA verification codes to the backend
  • jQuery.ajax() - Used extensively to send captured credentials and MFA codes to the attacker's server
  • SSSI.frontend.togglePassword() - Toggles password visibility to enhance user experience and trust
  • SSSI.util.updateModalButtons() - Manipulates modal dialogs to guide users through the phishing flow

Similar Websites

Pages with identical visual appearance (based on perceptual hash)

Screenshot
DHL
https://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/login.cfm?ref=...
Mar 23, 2026
No screenshot
DHL
https://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/login.cfm?ref=...
Mar 14, 2026
No screenshot
DHL
https://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/Login.cfm?ref=...
Mar 14, 2026
No screenshot
DHL
https://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/login.cfm?ref=...
Mar 01, 2026
 Screenshot
DHL
http://dhlguestmanagement.com/
Fev 11, 2026

Scan History for secure.dhlguestmanagement.com

Found 10 other scans for this domain

😰
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