SafeMode - Analysis: seguniao.pro

Visual Capture

Detection Info

https://seguniao.pro/inicio/01/?utm_source=google&utm_campaign=23546074452&utm_medium=194590480713&utm_content=796868565990&utm_term=::&keyword=&device=m&network=&gad_source=0&gad_campaignid=23546074452&gclid=Cj0KCQiA7rDMBhCjARIsAGDBuEBIxfFcbY--v0TQ58OBnFAjMdjEZcrvdpuUFJWM6de0XXRk1jYgA2kaAgK2EALw_wcB

Detected Brand

Nubank

Country

International

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

0887d6b0-9b1…

Analyzed

2026-02-12 00:44

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T11C32DB7072901ABB91CBD2E1B275AB5B72C8CB4BCA57D701A3F983845FC7C92DD48254
CONTENT ssdeep	192:EZLLSPaLKGHnC/EDwsTwaocZ4J3u5uxTRWAwzDfS:aL6QHnCsDwwZITJRWAwzDq

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b3333333c9cc6664
VISUAL aHash	e7e7e7ffe7e7ffff
VISUAL dHash	4d4d4d124c4d120a
VISUAL wHash	0707272f07072f3f
VISUAL colorHash	07200000030
VISUAL cropResistant	4d4d4d124c4d120a,33f4d989f9e5cdd9

Code Analysis

Risk Score 76/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer 🎣 Banking 🎣 Personal Info

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: Phishing
• Target: Nubank customers
• Method: Impersonation
• Exfil: Unknown
• Indicators: Domain mismatch, obfuscation, brand impersonation.
• Risk: High

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
unicode_escape

🎯 Kit Endpoints

https://evilmartians.com/chronicles/postcss-8-plugin-migration`),m.env.LANG&&m.env.LANG.startsWith(
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/content-configuration#safelisting-classes
https://tailwindcss.com`}),...e.nodes])},container:(()=
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/content-configuration
https://mths.be/cssesc
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/content-configuration#discarding-classes
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/upgrade-guide#prefix-cannot-be-a-function
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/upgrade-guide#configure-content-sources
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/using-with-preprocessors#nesting
https://seguniao.pro/inicio/01/js/B7PYnCHDexx2.js
https://cdn.tailwindcss.com
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/upgrade-guide#remove-dark-mode-configuration
https://www.w3ctech.com/topic/2226`));let
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/content-configuration#pattern-recommendations
https://twitter.com/browserslist
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/upgrade-guide#replace-variants-with-layer
https://tailwindcss.com/docs/installation

📡 API Calls Detected

POST

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch

The domain is not related to the legitimate brand Nubank.

Brand Impersonation

The site uses Nubank's branding and layout.

Obfuscation

Javascript obfuscation detected, indicating malicious intent.

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Banking Credential Harvester

Target

Nubank users (International)

Attack Method

Brand impersonation + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

Risk Assessment

HIGH - Automated credential harvesting with Form submission (backend endpoint not detected - likely JavaScript-based)

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
18 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

Nubank

Official Website

null

Fake Service

Personal Loan

Fraudulent Claims

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Brand impersonation

The attacker creates a website that mimics the appearance of Nubank to deceive users into entering their credentials or other sensitive information.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

B7PYnCHDexx2.js

File Size

Functions: consultarCPF(), redirecionarParaChat(), processForm(), localStorage.setItem()

📊 Attack Flow Diagram

1. Step 1: User lands on page with UTM-tracked campaign links
2. Step 2: User clicks 'Ativar' or 'Simular' button to access CPF form
3. Step 3: User enters CPF (validated client-side only)
4. Step 4: User agrees to fake terms and conditions
5. Step 5: processForm() saves CPF to localStorage and calls consultarCPF()
6. Step 6: consultarCPF() sends CPF to '../../inicio/getData.php' via GET request
7. Step 7: Server responds with full personal data (name, mother's name, birth date, gender, CPF)
8. Step 8: Data is displayed to user to build trust and stored in localStorage
9. Step 9: User clicks 'Confirmar' to trigger redirecionarParaChat()
10. Step 10: User is redirected to '../../inicio/02' with original query parameters (including UTM and CPF)
11. Step 11: Subsequent pages likely harvest banking credentials or other sensitive information

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language

Portuguese (1%)

Total Code Size

410.7 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

5

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Moderate
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: User lands on page with UTM-tracked campaign links
2. Step 2: User clicks 'Ativar' or 'Simular' button to access CPF form
3. Step 3: User enters CPF (validated client-side only)
4. Step 4: User agrees to fake terms and conditions
5. Step 5: processForm() saves CPF to localStorage and calls consultarCPF()
6. Step 6: consultarCPF() sends CPF to '../../inicio/getData.php' via GET request
7. Step 7: Server responds with full personal data (name, mother's name, birth date, gender, CPF)
8. Step 8: Data is displayed to user to build trust and stored in localStorage
9. Step 9: User clicks 'Confirmar' to trigger redirecionarParaChat()
10. Step 10: User is redirected to '../../inicio/02' with original query parameters (including UTM and CPF)
11. Step 11: Subsequent pages likely harvest banking credentials or other sensitive information