SafeMode - Analysis: dhlguestmanagement.com

Visual Capture

Detection Info

http://dhlguestmanagement.com/

Detected Brand

DHL

Country

International

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

103afd1d-7c8…

Analyzed

2026-02-11 12:01

Final URL (after redirects)

https://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/login.cfm

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T13C147614FB0107C484F9BCD5949772E4A041CE2FA34A65A7252F53F67CCACA63EA239D
CONTENT ssdeep	384:DHgJWIV7y4yLMiVH8z2IVvg/py2pLaQlmXBwJlVIXv4tY/Uo0Wo3mNKX:sJ/oS2AqpL0wTVIXv4sUo0Wo3mN2

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b8396c3c316ccec5
VISUAL aHash	81c3ffcfcf9fc3c3
VISUAL dHash	3b1b001c1c2a3737
VISUAL wHash	8181dfcfc79f8181
VISUAL colorHash	06400030000
VISUAL cropResistant	3b1b001c1c2a3737

Code Analysis

Risk Score 97/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer 🎣 Card Stealer 🎣 Banking 🎣 Personal Info

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: Credential Phishing
• Target: DHL customers
• Method: Impersonation via login form
• Exfil: /events2/login.cfm
• Indicators: Domain mismatch, login form, obfuscation
• Risk: High

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

atob
eval
fromCharCode
unescape
base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

http://www.dhl.com/en/contact_center/contact_global_forwarding.html
http://www.dhl.com/en/legal/fraud_awareness.html
http://www.sportssystems.com/xml/dynform
https://inmotion.dhl/img/partner-logos/partner_motogp.svg
https://inmotion.dhl/coldplay
https://inmotion.dhl/formula-e
https://inmotion.dhl/img/partner-logos/partner_wec.svg
http://dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/js/respond.1.4.2.min.js
https://inmotion.dhl/
https://inmotion.dhl/gewandhausorchester
https://inmotion.dhl/universal-music-group
https://inmotion.dhl/img/partner-logos/partner_ars.svg
http://dhlguestmanagement.com/CFJS/ajax/package/cfajax.js
https://inmotion.dhl/beethoven
https://inmotion.dhl/img/partner-logos/partner_umg.svg
https://inmotion.dhl/img/partner-logos/partner_wtcr.svg
https://secure.sportssystems.com/clientdata/429/
http://www.dhl.com/en/contact_center/contact_supplychain.html
http://www.dhl.com/en/contact_center/contact_parcel_ecommerce.html
https://inmotion.dhl/wtcr
http://dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/js/selectivizr.1.0.2.min.js
https://inmotion.dhl/img/partner-logos/partner_esports.svg
https://inmotion.dhl/esports
https://inmotion.dhl/motogp
http://www.dhl.com/en/legal/dispute_resolution.html
http://dhlguestmanagement.com/javascripts/webpack/dist/js/webpackBundle_frontend.js?v=2.1.597
http://dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/foundation-5.5.2/js/foundation.min.js
https://inmotion.dhl/img/partner-logos/partner_mi.svg
https://inmotion.dhl/img/partner-logos/partner_gwo.svg
http://dhlguestmanagement.com/eventdata/9747/js/application.js?v=2025101515541836
/events2/login.cfm

📡 API Calls Detected

GET

📤 Form Action Targets

/events2/login.cfm

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch

The domain 'dhlguestmanagement.com' is not a recognized DHL domain.

Login Form

Presence of a login form raises suspicion, particularly when the domain is questionable.

JavaScript Obfuscation

The use of obfuscation techniques suggests an attempt to hide malicious code.

Form actions

The form action points to /events2/login.cfm which is unusual

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Banking Credential Harvester

Target

DHL users (International)

Attack Method

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

HTTP POST to backend

Risk Assessment

CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
38 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

DHL

Official Website

dhl.com

Fake Service

DHL Guest Management System

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Phishing

The attacker aims to steal user credentials by mimicking a legitimate DHL login page and tricking users into entering their information.

Secondary Method: Social Engineering

The attacker leverages the brand recognition of DHL to gain trust and deceive users.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

cfmessage.js

File Size

Functions: validatePassword(), validateFormFieldData(), processFrontEndAssignment(), getContactData(), setCookie() / killCookies(), checkKillSwitch(), sssiUtil.preventHighJack()

📊 Attack Flow Diagram

1. Step 1: User lands on phishing page mimicking DHL Guest Management System login portal.
2. Step 2: User enters username (email) and password into the form.
3. Step 3: Form submission triggers AJAX POST to `/events2/login.cfm` with `doLogin` action.
4. Step 4: Backend ColdFusion component (`ControllerProxy.cfc`) processes credentials via `validatePassword()` and `validateFormFieldData()`.
5. Step 5: Session cookies (`SS_NAVB`, antiCsfrToken) are set or killed to manage user sessions and evade detection.
6. Step 6: Credentials are stored server-side or forwarded to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
7. Step 7: User is potentially redirected or shown a fake error message to delay suspicion.

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language

English (1%)

Total Code Size

2.2 MB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

44

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Light
: Light
: Light
: Light
: Light
: Light
: Light
: Light
: Light
: Light
: Light

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: User lands on phishing page mimicking DHL Guest Management System login portal.
2. Step 2: User enters username (email) and password into the form.
3. Step 3: Form submission triggers AJAX POST to `/events2/login.cfm` with `doLogin` action.
4. Step 4: Backend ColdFusion component (`ControllerProxy.cfc`) processes credentials via `validatePassword()` and `validateFormFieldData()`.
5. Step 5: Session cookies (`SS_NAVB`, antiCsfrToken) are set or killed to manage user sessions and evade detection.
6. Step 6: Credentials are stored server-side or forwarded to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
7. Step 7: User is potentially redirected or shown a fake error message to delay suspicion.

🎯 Malicious Files Identified

Main Drainer

cfmessage.js

File Size

The extracted code spans multiple script blocks and external references, but the core malicious logic is embedded in the HTML/JavaScript (estimated ~300-500KB including dependencies like `webpackBundle_frontend.js`).