SafeMode - Analysis: secure.dhlguestmanagement.com

Visual Capture

Screenshot of secure.dhlguestmanagement.com

Detection Info

http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/login.cfm?ref=/events2/index.cfm?auuid=420108F3-DCB0-B861-0DE000110CB3961Acredapp.cfm&statusCodeID=10

Detected Brand

DHL

Country

Unknown

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

fc73c905-821…

Analyzed

2026-02-09 23:55

Final URL (after redirects)

https://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/events2/login.cfm?ref=/events2/index.cfm?auuid=420108F3-DCB0-B861-0DE000110CB3961Acredapp.cfm&statusCodeID=10

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T13B147614FB0207C484F9BCD5949772E4A041CE2FA34A6597252F53F67CCACA63EA239D
CONTENT ssdeep	384:DHgJWIVlJTy4yLMiVH8z2IVvg/py2pLaQlmXBwJlVIXv4kcYbUo0Wo3mNKX:sJ/wS2AqpL0wTVIXv4+Uo0Wo3mN2

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b8396c3c316ccec5
VISUAL aHash	81c3ffcfcf9fc3c3
VISUAL dHash	3b1b001c1c2a3737
VISUAL wHash	8181dfcfc79f8181
VISUAL colorHash	06400030000
VISUAL cropResistant	3b1b001c1c2a3737

Code Analysis

Risk Score 85/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer 🎣 Card Stealer 🎣 Banking 🎣 Personal Info

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

atob
eval
fromCharCode
unescape
base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/js/rem.1.3.4.min.js
http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
https://)
http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/js/selectivizr.1.0.2.min.js
http://stackoverflow.com/a/32954565/96342
http://blog.jquery.com/2012/08/09/jquery-1-8-released/
http://iptc.org/std/Iptc4xmpExt/2008-02-29/
http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/foundation-5.5.2/js/foundation.min.js
http://heydonworks.com/practical_aria_examples/js/a11y.js
http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/eventdata/9747/js/Canlendar/fullcalendar.js?ev=32
http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/CFJS/ajax/package/cfajax.js
https://),url(https://),red
http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/CFJS/ajax/messages/cfmessage.js
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php
http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
http://www.gettyimages.com/xsltExtension/1.0
http://jqueryui.com/demos/position/
http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lti/2008/04/23/a-regular-expression-to-match-any-url/
http://schemas.android.com/apk/lib/com.google.android.gms.plus
https://jqueryui.com
http://secure.dhlguestmanagement.com/lib/responsive/js/respond.1.4.2.min.js
http://jquery.org/license
https://learn.jquery.com/using-jquery-core/faq/how-do-i-select-an-element-by-an-id-that-has-characters-used-in-css-notation/)
http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
http://fgelinas.com/code/timepicker
http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
https://fullcalendar.io/
http://underscorejs.org
http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/states-of-the-type-attribute.html#valid-e-mail-address
/events2/login.cfm?&ref=%2Fevents2%2Findex%2Ecfm%3Fauuid%3D420108F3%2DDCB0%2DB861%2D0DE000110CB3961Acredapp%2Ecfm&statuscodeid=10

📡 API Calls Detected

get
GET

📤 Form Action Targets

/events2/login.cfm?&ref=%2Fevents2%2Findex%2Ecfm%3Fauuid%3D420108F3%2DDCB0%2DB861%2D0DE000110CB3961Acredapp%2Ecfm&statuscodeid=10

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit

Detected kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Banking, Personal Info

Credential Harvesting

Credential harvesting detected with 5 form(s) capturing sensitive data

Code Obfuscation

JavaScript code obfuscated using 46 technique(s) to evade detection

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Banking Credential Harvester

Target

DHL users

Attack Method

credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

HTTP POST to backend

Risk Assessment

CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Card Stealer, Banking, Personal Info
46 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

DHL

Official Website

N/A

Fake Service

Token swap/DEX platform

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

Victim enters username and password into fake login form. Credentials are captured via JavaScript and exfiltrated to attacker's server in real-time.

Secondary Method: JavaScript Obfuscation

Malicious code is obfuscated using 46 techniques to evade detection by security scanners and make reverse engineering more difficult.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

webpackBundle_frontend.js?v=2.1.597

File Size

Functions: SSSI.frontend.validatePW() - Validates password complexity against backend rules, SSSI.frontend.svalidatePasswords() - Compares password fields for consistency, SSSI.frontend.sendVerificationCode() - Sends MFA verification codes to user-provided phone numbers, SSSI.frontend.loginResendVerificationCode() - Resends MFA codes to capture updated credentials, SSSI.frontend.verifyMFA() - Submits MFA verification codes to the backend, jQuery.ajax() - Used extensively to send captured credentials and MFA codes to the attacker's server, SSSI.frontend.togglePassword() - Toggles password visibility to enhance user experience and trust, SSSI.util.updateModalButtons() - Manipulates modal dialogs to guide users through the phishing flow

📊 Attack Flow Diagram

1. Step 1: User lands on the spoofed DHL guest management portal ('secure.dhlguestmanagement.com')
2. Step 2: User enters login credentials (username/email and password) into the dynamically generated form
3. Step 3: Password complexity is validated client-side via SSSI.frontend.validatePW(), which sends the password to the backend for validation (AJAX POST to ControllerProxy.cfc)
4. Step 4: If MFA is enabled, the user is prompted to enter a phone number for verification code delivery
5. Step 5: SSSI.frontend.sendVerificationCode() sends the phone number to the backend, triggering an SMS with a verification code
6. Step 6: User enters the MFA code, which is captured and sent to the backend via SSSI.frontend.verifyMFA()
7. Step 7: If the user requests a resend of the MFA code, SSSI.frontend.loginResendVerificationCode() captures the updated phone number or MFA channel (SMS/WhatsApp)
8. Step 8: All captured data (credentials, phone numbers, MFA codes) is exfiltrated via AJAX POST requests to the attacker's ColdFusion backend
9. Step 9: The backend processes the data, likely storing it for later use or forwarding it to the attacker via email, Telegram, or another exfiltration channel

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language

English (1%)

Total Code Size

1.5 MB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

29

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: None
: Light
: Light
: None
: Light
: None
: Moderate
: Light
: Light
: Light
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: User lands on the spoofed DHL guest management portal ('secure.dhlguestmanagement.com')
2. Step 2: User enters login credentials (username/email and password) into the dynamically generated form
3. Step 3: Password complexity is validated client-side via SSSI.frontend.validatePW(), which sends the password to the backend for validation (AJAX POST to ControllerProxy.cfc)
4. Step 4: If MFA is enabled, the user is prompted to enter a phone number for verification code delivery
5. Step 5: SSSI.frontend.sendVerificationCode() sends the phone number to the backend, triggering an SMS with a verification code
6. Step 6: User enters the MFA code, which is captured and sent to the backend via SSSI.frontend.verifyMFA()
7. Step 7: If the user requests a resend of the MFA code, SSSI.frontend.loginResendVerificationCode() captures the updated phone number or MFA channel (SMS/WhatsApp)
8. Step 8: All captured data (credentials, phone numbers, MFA codes) is exfiltrated via AJAX POST requests to the attacker's ColdFusion backend
9. Step 9: The backend processes the data, likely storing it for later use or forwarding it to the attacker via email, Telegram, or another exfiltration channel

🎯 Malicious Files Identified

Main Drainer

webpackBundle_frontend.js?v=2.1.597

File Size

603KB

Malicious Functions

SSSI.frontend.validatePW() - Validates password complexity against backend rules
SSSI.frontend.svalidatePasswords() - Compares password fields for consistency
SSSI.frontend.sendVerificationCode() - Sends MFA verification codes to user-provided phone numbers
SSSI.frontend.loginResendVerificationCode() - Resends MFA codes to capture updated credentials
SSSI.frontend.verifyMFA() - Submits MFA verification codes to the backend
jQuery.ajax() - Used extensively to send captured credentials and MFA codes to the attacker's server
SSSI.frontend.togglePassword() - Toggles password visibility to enhance user experience and trust
SSSI.util.updateModalButtons() - Manipulates modal dialogs to guide users through the phishing flow