SafeMode - Analysis: candidtechnologies.co

Visual Capture

Detection Info

https://candidtechnologies.co/master/upgrde/pla_bins/login2.php

Detected Brand

plala

Country

International

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

8fe5e55a-607…

Analyzed

2026-02-13 00:52

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1A1B1C01493412B0E64A591F6C3606FA843E28C2ED7321958985EE63F1CCD54EED6BBFC
CONTENT ssdeep	96:jN4CpfHSfo47lGCty5vk+7TSTre5b1/LhC5Sb3yJSLP0z3lKZVwcbwYxyCPoZz0F:jWUyUBWcb10KibALJxawD

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	969339389e9998dc
VISUAL aHash	1c243c3c3c000000
VISUAL dHash	394d686865140000
VISUAL wHash	1c243c3c3f030f0f
VISUAL colorHash	07050000400
VISUAL cropResistant	394d686865140000

Code Analysis

Risk Score 82/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 Banking 🎣 Personal Info

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: Credential Phishing
• Target: plala users
• Method: Mimicking login page
• Exfil: cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php
• Indicators: Forms requesting credentials, suspicious domain
• Risk: HIGH

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
document.write
hex_escape
base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

https://candidtechnologies.co/master/upgrde/pla_bins/files/common.js.download
http://www.plala.or.jp/
https://candidtechnologies.co/master/upgrde/pla_bins/files/tags.js.download
https://candidtechnologies.co/master/upgrde/pla_bins/files/script.js.download

📤 Form Action Targets

cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit

The site is actively attempting to steal user credentials through a convincing, but fake, login form.

Domain Mismatch

The domain does not belong to the brand being impersonated (plala).

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Banking Credential Harvester

Target

plala users (International)

Attack Method

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

HTTP POST to backend

Risk Assessment

CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking, Personal Info
130 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

plala

Fake Service

Login

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker is using a fake login form to collect user credentials.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

tdz_8e2a25279bc64e9ab2f073b3c73f45ac.js

File Size

Functions: td_5a.td_2d (XMLHttpRequest initializer), td_5a.tdz_8e2a25279bc64e9ab2f073b3c73f45ac.td_f (string decryption), td_5a.td_2m (ActiveX fallback), td_5a.td_4w (likely form submission handler, from Round 1), td_5a.td_5y (likely data collection, from Round 1)

📊 Attack Flow Diagram

1. Step 1: Malicious script loads and decrypts strings (e.g., form fields, C2 URL)
2. Step 2: Dynamic form injection into the DOM (likely via td_5a.td_4w or similar)
3. Step 3: User enters credentials into fake banking form
4. Step 4: td_5a.td_5y captures input data
5. Step 5: td_5a.td_2d initializes XMLHttpRequest and sends data to C2 server

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

105.0 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Moderate
: None
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: Malicious script loads and decrypts strings (e.g., form fields, C2 URL)
2. Step 2: Dynamic form injection into the DOM (likely via td_5a.td_4w or similar)
3. Step 3: User enters credentials into fake banking form
4. Step 4: td_5a.td_5y captures input data
5. Step 5: td_5a.td_2d initializes XMLHttpRequest and sends data to C2 server