SafeMode - Analysis: packages.soulservices.com

Visual Capture

Detection Info

https://packages.soulservices.com/activeplala/sso.login/login2.php

Detected Brand

plala

Country

Japan

Confidence

100%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

c97d7f8a-9d7…

Analyzed

2026-01-27 13:51

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1A1B1C01493412B0E64A591F6C3606FA843E28C2ED7321958985EE63F1CCD54EED6BBFC
CONTENT ssdeep	96:jN4CpfHSfo47lGCty5vk+7TSTre5b1/LhC5Sb3yJSLP0z3lKZVwcbwYxyCPoZz0F:jWUyUBWcb10KibALJxawD

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	969339389e9998dc
VISUAL aHash	1c243c3c3c000000
VISUAL dHash	394d686865140000
VISUAL wHash	1c243c3c3f030f0f
VISUAL colorHash	07050000400
VISUAL cropResistant	394d686865140000

Code Analysis

Risk Score 82/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 Banking 🎣 Personal Info

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: Credential harvesting phishing kit targeting Plala users.
• Target: Plala customers in Japan.
• Method: Fake login form stealing user ID and password.
• Exfil: Data sent to cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php.
• Indicators: Domain unrelated to brand, obfuscated JavaScript, multiple forms, form action points to a suspicious path.
• Risk: HIGH - Immediate credential theft.

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

fromCharCode
document.write
hex_escape
base64_strings

📤 Form Action Targets

cgi-binsso/pf/agent_sso.php

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

100/100

Contributing Factors

Active Phishing Kit

Detected Credential Harvester kit with real-time form interception for user credentials.

High Obfuscation

130 obfuscation techniques detected, indicating deliberate evasion of analysis.

Brand Impersonation

Targeting 'plala', a known service provider, to harvest user credentials.

Form-Based Attack

3 forms detected, designed to capture sensitive user information (ユーザID, 本パスワード).

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Banking Credential Harvester

Target

plala users (Japan)

Attack Method

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

HTTP POST to backend

Risk Assessment

CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester, Banking, Personal Info
130 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

plala

Official Website

https://www.plala.or.jp/

Fake Service

Single Sign-On (SSO) login portal

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The phishing kit captures user credentials (ユーザID and 本パスワード) via a fake login form. The data is likely transmitted to a backend server controlled by the attacker for immediate exploitation or sale on underground markets.

Secondary Method: Account Takeover

Once credentials are harvested, attackers can gain unauthorized access to the victim's 'plala' account, enabling further exploitation such as unauthorized transactions, data theft, or lateral movement within the victim's digital ecosystem.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

Domain Information

Domain

packages.soulservices.com

Registered

2003-05-24 15:02:47+00:00

Registrar

Web Commerce Communications Limited dba WebNic.cc

Status

Active (8283 days old)

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File

File Size

JavaScript file with high obfuscation, likely used for credential harvesting and form interception.

📊 Attack Flow Diagram

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. VICTIM RECEIVES PHISHING LINK                          │
│    - Email/SMS with fake "PLALA" Banking alert            │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. FAKE LOGIN PAGE LOADED                                 │
│    - Spoofed PLALA Banking portal displayed               │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. CREDENTIAL INPUT                                       │
│    - Victim enters username/password                      │
│    - Form appears identical to legitimate site            │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA CAPTURED                                         │
│    - Credentials sent via HTTP POST to attacker server    │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Total Code Size

105.0 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other

1

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

: Moderate
: None
: None

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. VICTIM RECEIVES PHISHING LINK                          │
│    - Email/SMS with fake "PLALA" Banking alert            │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. FAKE LOGIN PAGE LOADED                                 │
│    - Spoofed PLALA Banking portal displayed               │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. CREDENTIAL INPUT                                       │
│    - Victim enters username/password                      │
│    - Form appears identical to legitimate site            │
└────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                     │
                     ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. DATA CAPTURED                                         │
│    - Credentials sent via HTTP POST to attacker server    │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘