SafeMode - Analysis: ipfs.io

Visual Capture

Detection Info

https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreibmtwvvsxatea5csxxbiois35murli4y7oqaajd2zsow5nfqmfzwm

Detected Brand

Zimbra

Country

International

Confidence

95%

HTTP Status

200

Report ID

92f1e7a5-377…

Analyzed

2026-02-14 01:28

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm	Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH	T1C581C72180069C76859351C469A0BF5857E983B8C703584DF8EA8F8D2AE3DE9E3573DE
CONTENT ssdeep	96:4S0Zhl4eX3m0jcAmOUEs7whV4C6j0Lb9/z:UX3hjcaUdUhVB6ub9/z

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm	Hash Value
VISUAL pHash	b3e6cccc33332166
VISUAL aHash	ffffe3c3e7ffffe7
VISUAL dHash	204d4d4d4d32040c
VISUAL wHash	ffffe7c3e7000000
VISUAL colorHash	070000001c0
VISUAL cropResistant	204d4d4d4d32040c,c080a201a280a200,088bf0f464f0f00e

Code Analysis

Risk Score 53/100

Threat Level ALTO

⚠️ Phishing Confirmed

🎣 Credential Harvester

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: Credential Harvesting
• Target: Zimbra users
• Method: Impersonation and Form Capture
• Exfil: https://rubin2020brands.com/wp-includes/Text/wehgczb/1ayndfz/jucpwmh/hasco.php
• Indicators: Domain mismatch, suspicious form action, obfuscation.
• Risk: HIGH

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

document.write

🎯 Kit Endpoints

https://blog.zimbra.com
https://mail.avselectro.ru/css/common,login,zhtml,skin.css?skin=harmony&v=220324083352

📤 Form Action Targets

https://rubin2020brands.com/wp-includes/Text/wehgczb/1ayndfz/jucpwmh/hasco.php

📊 Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score

90/100

Contributing Factors

Suspicious Form Action

The form action directs to a domain unrelated to the target brand.

Obfuscation Detected

Obfuscation is often used to hide malicious code from detection.

Domain Mismatch

The site is hosted on a domain that is unrelated to the target brand.

🔬 Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type

Credential Harvesting Kit

Target

Zimbra users (International)

Attack Method

Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript

Exfiltration Channel

HTTP POST to backend

Risk Assessment

MEDIUM - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

Kit types: Credential Harvester
1 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand

Zimbra

Official Website

https://www.zimbra.com

Fake Service

Zimbra Login

⚔️ Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker creates a fake login page that mimics the Zimbra login. Users are tricked into entering their credentials, which are then sent to a malicious server.