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Visual Capture

Screenshot of ipfs.io

Detection Info

https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreibmtwvvsxatea5csxxbiois35murli4y7oqaajd2zsow5nfqmfzwm
Detected Brand
Zimbra
Country
International
Confidence
95%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
9a65f73d-0fc…
Analyzed
2026-02-14 00:11

Content Hashes (HTML Similarity)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T1C581C72180069C76859351C469A0BF5857E983B8C703584DF8EA8F8D2AE3DE9E3573DE
CONTENT ssdeep
96:4S0Zhl4eX3m0jcAmOUEs7whV4C6j0Lb9/z:UX3hjcaUdUhVB6ub9/z

Visual Hashes (Screenshot Similarity)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
b3e6cccc33332166
VISUAL aHash
ffffe3c3e7ffffe7
VISUAL dHash
204d4d4d4d32040c
VISUAL wHash
ffffe7c3e7000000
VISUAL colorHash
070000001c0
VISUAL cropResistant
204d4d4d4d32040c,c080a201a280a200,088bf0f464f0f00e

Code Analysis

Risk Score 53/100
Threat Level ALTO
āš ļø Phishing Confirmed
šŸŽ£ Credential Harvester

šŸ”¬ Threat Analysis Report

• Threat: Credential Harvesting
• Target: Zimbra Users
• Method: Phishing via a fake login page.
• Exfil: https://rubin2020brands.com/wp-includes/Text/wehgczb/1ayndfz/jucpwmh/hasco.php
• Indicators: Domain mismatch, obfuscation, form action to suspicious domain
• Risk: HIGH

šŸ” Credential Harvesting Forms

šŸ”’ Obfuscation Detected

  • document.write

šŸŽÆ Kit Endpoints

  • https://mail.avselectro.ru/css/common,login,zhtml,skin.css?skin=harmony&v=220324083352
  • https://blog.zimbra.com

šŸ“¤ Form Action Targets

  • https://rubin2020brands.com/wp-includes/Text/wehgczb/1ayndfz/jucpwmh/hasco.php

šŸ“Š Risk Score Breakdown

Total Risk Score
90/100

Contributing Factors

Suspicious Form Action
The form submits data to a domain known for hosting malicious content.
Domain Mismatch
The domain hosting the page does not belong to Zimbra and is unrelated to the brand.
Obfuscation
The presence of obfuscated Javascript suggests malicious intent.
Impersonation
The page tries to impersonate Zimbra's login page.

šŸ”¬ Comprehensive Threat Analysis

Threat Type
Credential Harvesting Kit
Target
Zimbra users (International)
Attack Method
Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Exfiltration Channel
HTTP POST to backend
Risk Assessment
MEDIUM - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

āš ļø Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester
  • 1 obfuscation techniques

šŸ¢ Brand Impersonation Analysis

Impersonated Brand
Zimbra
Official Website
null
Fake Service
Zimbra Login

āš”ļø Attack Methodology

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker sets up a fake Zimbra login page on a compromised domain. Users are tricked into entering their login credentials on this fake page, which are then harvested by the attacker.

🌐 Infrastructure Indicators of Compromise

Domain Information

Domain
ipfs.io
Registered
2014-05-16
Registrar
Unknown
Status
Active

šŸ¤– AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

😰
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