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Phishing Analysis

Detailed analysis of captured phishing page

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Captura Visual

Screenshot of docs.lighting.com

Información de Detección

https://docs.lighting.com/:u:/g/personal/diego_carvajal_gonzalez_signify_com/IQC9ec0vkxooSZibOAtB3QEqAUrzsq-b7G5gjCNMxbQHiPw
Detected Brand
Microsoft
Country
International
Confianza
100%
HTTP Status
200
Report ID
2cb0cad4-6a5…
Analyzed
2026-02-11 11:51

Hashes de Contenido (Similitud HTML)

Used to detect similar phishing pages based on HTML content

Algorithm Hash Value
CONTENT TLSH
T1C6C1F871A2309DB301A2D2E4FAE6B74BB1C282AACB06560152EC935D0EF7E85DD711E4
CONTENT ssdeep
96:gc2ET3hZ4zjHsDTRMS8BSfEdNRPyEffgcHLZQtwD0u8BQ8vrS3eeK5NpLA8g8D0C:OM3hZAHSRMS8BSfEdNwHcHLZQmvK5r51

Hashes Visuales (Similitud de Captura)

Used to detect visually similar phishing pages based on screenshots

Algorithm Hash Value
VISUAL pHash
b3734c4c66735919
VISUAL aHash
00ffffe7e7ffffff
VISUAL dHash
0808324c4c300000
VISUAL wHash
00080c04c7dfcfcf
VISUAL colorHash
070000001c0
VISUAL cropResistant
0c281a4c0c100000,0000004040400080

Análisis de Código

Risk Score 85/100
Nivel de Amenaza ALTO
⚠️ Phishing Confirmed
🎣 Credential Harvester 🎣 OTP Stealer 🎣 Personal Info

🔬 Threat Analysis Report

• Amenaza: Phishing
• Objetivo: Usuarios de Microsoft
• Método: Suplantación de identidad y recopilación de credenciales
• Exfil: /personal/diego_carvajal_gonzalez_signify_com/_layouts/15/guestaccess.aspx?share=IQC9ec0vkxooSZibOAtB3QEqAUrzsq-b7G5gjCNMxbQHiPw
• Indicadores: Coincidencia de dominio, solicitud de correo electrónico, uso de Javascript ofuscado
• Riesgo: Alto

🔐 Credential Harvesting Forms

🔒 Obfuscation Detected

  • eval
  • fromCharCode
  • unescape
  • document.write
  • base64_strings

🎯 Kit Endpoints

  • https://res-1.cdn.office.net${ar()}`}let
  • https://www.onedrive-tst.com
  • https://res-1.cdn.office.net/files/odsp-web-prod_2026-01-23.008/spoguestaccesswebpack/spoguestaccess.js
  • https://res-1.cdn.office.net/bld/_layouts/15/16.0.26928.12006/require.js
  • https://docs.lighting.com/ScriptResource.axd?d=QypiA9NcvCE7tHTonLgCuDn5nTtu4P1UBQTrWSerezV1CNBcZwuodjKltgWf9IiB6kiHBT9YK7dRMbzLx79tQDHv07zmrMwdU8pzzrr83XvxJa3ZS9lUTq17ELgkLhLyCZgbgcGqb561UZQYcJPMhs_avwbopqpwaztTHXH1Etc1&t=ffffffff93d1c106
  • https://res-1.cdn.office.net/files/fabric-cdn-prod_20230815.002/assets
  • https://docs.lighting.com/ScriptResource.axd?d=Pi4SIhR9eGpJF9JIc26P0bhzlZpSY4YiHKU8pgn9rVOJtfsHPgXDWZGaewMHPQSTcQt6s3nawR9MVKa1M_sjdpYZqPGMxyYMELViqT041jJSzrLzAyVrn8IrQxflKSm6gb6eX6zccguwdRRkhg8wH520g4f2tOksH_xHFgD_6CDI4W0erM4yFXheVPfZGIcz0&t=5c0e0825
  • https://reactjs.org/docs/error-decoder.html?invariant=
  • http://requirejs.org/docs/errors.html#
  • http://www.mozilla.org/newlayout/xml/parsererror.xml
  • https://docs.lighting.com/ScriptResource.axd?d=bckPGw5naV-XvJirhYegq0UHSz9euyKKpNII3_4EWe7MX7ULH1TB5KYbUomOHwV_J0a_KB4AUdN9H__gFtMbTYIKJCEt6rcYcQOxuT5YzJXnxUxZOOdkLNZy4YGf7QlkNvKTqsk4bK15M6GdQdAvcW2wqx2rY5a_AZigpKFZWDr1x0EmTf5LsYAGS2kUsrtU0&t=5c0e0825
  • https://docs.lighting.com/WebResource.axd?d=wpwjJb4qar_gppHJbiOmnrGbOHczyPhTPfpK3ZGOHGjyEqf7WjSg5h9c6amTi4i3uVT7EJzPXW80BPij9FqFPu2GJv900LiUnCgtSZM9j101&t=639034846819255068

📡 API Calls Detected

  • POST
  • javascript:

📤 Form Action Targets

  • /personal/diego_carvajal_gonzalez_signify_com/_layouts/15/guestaccess.aspx?share=IQC9ec0vkxooSZibOAtB3QEqAUrzsq-b7G5gjCNMxbQHiPw

📊 Desglose de Puntuación de Riesgo

Total Risk Score
90/100

Contributing Factors

Domain Mismatch
The domain does not belong to Microsoft.
JavaScript Obfuscation
Javascript obfuscation indicates potentially malicious activity.
Request for Email
Requests for email addresses are highly suspicious and often associated with credential harvesting.

🔬 Análisis Integral de Amenazas

Tipo de Amenaza
Two-Factor Authentication Stealer
Objetivo
Microsoft users (International)
Método de Ataque
Brand impersonation + credential harvesting forms + obfuscated JavaScript
Canal de Exfiltración
HTTP POST to backend
Evaluación de Riesgo
CRITICAL - Automated credential harvesting with HTTP POST to backend

⚠️ Indicators of Compromise

  • Kit types: Credential Harvester, OTP Stealer, Personal Info
  • 48 obfuscation techniques

🏢 Análisis de Suplantación de Marca

Impersonated Brand
Microsoft
Official Website
https://www.microsoft.com/
Fake Service
OneDrive

⚔️ Metodología de Ataque

Primary Method: Credential Harvesting

The attacker aims to steal user credentials by mimicking a legitimate login page and prompting the user to enter their email.

Secondary Method: Social Engineering

The phishing email leverages the user's familiarity with Microsoft services to trick them into entering their credentials.

🌐 Indicadores de Compromiso de Infraestructura

🦠 Malicious Files

Main File
WebForms.js (or similar ASP.NET client-side script)
File Size

Functions: WebForm_DoCallback(), WebForm_CallbackComplete(), WebForm_ExecuteCallback(), WebForm_InitCallback(), WebForm_InitCallbackAddField(), __doPostBack()

📊 Diagrama de Flujo de Ataque

1. Step 1: User lands on spoofed SharePoint/Office 365 document sharing page
2. Step 2: Page loads legitimate-looking UI with Microsoft CDN resources
3. Step 3: WebForm_InitCallback() silently collects all form fields (including password inputs) into __theFormPostCollection
4. Step 4: User interaction (e.g., clicking 'Open Document') triggers __doPostBack() or WebForm_DoCallback()
5. Step 5: Callback function dynamically creates hidden iframe or XMLHttpRequest to submit collected data to server
6. Step 6: WebForm_ExecuteCallback() processes server response (success/error) to maintain illusion of legitimacy
7. Step 7: Credentials are exfiltrated to attacker's server while user is redirected to a 'loading' or error page

🔬 JavaScript Deep Analysis

Operator Language
English (1%)
Total Code Size
244,4 KB

🔗 API Endpoints Detected

Other
4

🔐 Obfuscation Detected

  • : Light
  • : None
  • : Light
  • : Light
  • : Moderate
  • : Light

🤖 AI-Extracted Threat Intelligence

📊 Attack Flow

1. Step 1: User lands on spoofed SharePoint/Office 365 document sharing page
2. Step 2: Page loads legitimate-looking UI with Microsoft CDN resources
3. Step 3: WebForm_InitCallback() silently collects all form fields (including password inputs) into __theFormPostCollection
4. Step 4: User interaction (e.g., clicking 'Open Document') triggers __doPostBack() or WebForm_DoCallback()
5. Step 5: Callback function dynamically creates hidden iframe or XMLHttpRequest to submit collected data to server
6. Step 6: WebForm_ExecuteCallback() processes server response (success/error) to maintain illusion of legitimacy
7. Step 7: Credentials are exfiltrated to attacker's server while user is redirected to a 'loading' or error page

🎯 Malicious Files Identified

Main Drainer
WebForms.js (or similar ASP.NET client-side script)
File Size
~150KB (based on extracted code volume)
Malicious Functions
  • WebForm_DoCallback()
  • WebForm_CallbackComplete()
  • WebForm_ExecuteCallback()
  • WebForm_InitCallback()
  • WebForm_InitCallbackAddField()
  • __doPostBack()

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http://susumilkuenak.github.io/jonsbo/re-verify.html
Ene 04, 2026

Scan History for docs.lighting.com

Found 10 other scans for this domain

😰
"Nunca pensé que me pasaría a mí"
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